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CONFLICT VULNERAB ILITY
ASSESSMENT BOLIVIA
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Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University

The views and recommendations expressed in this report are solely of the
author and are not necessarily those of USAID or the U.S. Government.

INTRODUCTION
In January 2003 a research team directed by Professor Eduardo A. Gamarra of Florida
International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), which
included professors Ivana Deheza (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés), and Robert Albro
(Wheaton College) presented the first version of the Conflict Vulnerability Assessment
(CVA) to MSI, a Washington based consulting firm contracted by USAID. The CVA
was designed to assist USAID/Bolivia identify and rank both current and potential
sources and areas of conflict and analyze them in terms of their implications for the new
(2004-2008) Country Strategic Plan currently in development. The CVA team was also
asked to propose additions or modifications to USAID assistance that can prevent or
mitigate conflict, or effectively channel conflict to address its causes in a positive,
nonviolent manner.
More specifically, the CVA’s objective was to attempt an explanation of the root sources
of conflict in Bolivia and to analyze the impact of existing and proposed USAID
programs in terms of their effectiveness in preventing, mitigating or managing conflict.
The CVA team was asked to delineate the boundaries of what could be done realistically
to achieve conflict prevention, mitigation, and management. Furthermore the basic
framework employed by the CVA sought to identify windows of vulnerability, including
particular events or types of events that could trigger the outbreak of violence. It also
aimed to identify windows of opportunity involving types of conflict that could be
precursors to positive change or facilitate violent conflict prevention or mitigation
Data for the CVA included over 100 interviews with key informants including three
former presidents and a wide array of leading political figures. Additionally, a series of
focus groups were conducted in the cities of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa
Cruz. Of note were three such groups with a heterogeneous mix of members of the
police. These groups were significant mainly because of the protagonist role that the
Bolivian National Police would come to play after February 2003. The qualitative data
collected for the CVA was supplemented by a quantitative data analysis that allowed the
team to develop a Map of social conflicts in Bolivia.
The CVA provided an assessment of the situation in Bolivia in late 2002 and highlighted
possible future scenarios of potential conflict. The data collected enabled the CVA team
to group conflict vulnerability into five overarching and interrelated categories. These
included:
Ø Political institutional matters, such as the profound crisis of political institutions
and the overall apparent end of the pattern of “pacted democracy” between the
country’s principal political parties;
Ø Problems of economic development stemming from the collapse of Bolivia’s so
called Neoliberal development strategy launched in 1985 under the rubric of the
New Economic Policy;
Ø The pattern of land use and tenure that has led to increasingly intense calls for a
new land reform and for an end to land reconcentration;
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Ø Concern for increasing public insecurity nationally, as increased violence and
criminality spread throughout the country; and,
Ø An entire array of issues related to the coca and cocaine industry ranging from the
increasing power and political prominence of coca growers to the apparent lack of
alternatives to US crop eradication policy.
Five underlying assumptions (or transversal themes) frame the study. First, Bolivia
represents an extreme case of vulnerability to international factors. These factors affect
directly or condition the pattern of decision making and, as a result, often pit government
officials bent on defending policy choices against a wide array of social actors. Second,
Bolivia’s extreme poverty increases the country’s vulnerability to conflict. This pattern
of vulnerability to conflict is further exacerbated by one of the worst patterns of wealth
distribution in the Western Hemisphere. Third, the profundity of social exclusion in
Bolivia despite attempts since the 1952 Revolution and the entire process of reform
during the democratization experience to make Bolivia a more inclusive society and
polity. Social exclusion in Bolivia takes many forms but for the purposes of this study it
basically includes race, ethnicity, age, and gender. Fourth, the culture of mobilization
that exists in Bolivia makes for a peculiar set of interactions between state and society.
The culture of mobilization has contributed to the consolidation of a pattern in which
social actors avoid weak or undeveloped institutional channels to redress grievances and
search for more direct action to extract concessions from the government. The fifth and
final assumption has to do with the overwhelming weakness of the Bolivia state, which is
reflected not only in the institutional structures but its inability to control national
territory, collect taxes and fees from the citizenry, and simply to enact policy.
As 2003 got under way, a number of the scenarios developed by the CVA team
lamentably came to fruition and Bolivia appeared to be headed in a downward spiral that
threatened the core of the political system. As a result of the events that triggered
violence and turmoil in January and February 2003, USAID hired Professor Gamarra to
provide an update of the CVA and to disseminate the results of the study. Research for
this update was conducted between the months of March and June 2003. The research
phase included a battery of 30 in depth interviews with analysts, policymakers, political
party leaders and other key informants. Additionally, this update benefited greatly from
ongoing work conducted by Gamarra in collaboration with Fernando Calderón of the
United Nations Development Program. In particular this study has benefited from an
additional batch of 25 interviews with political party leaders, nine focus groups
conducted in La Paz in the aftermath of the February 2003 riots, and recent survey data. 1
Suffice it to say that the interpretation and analysis presented herein does not reflect the
point of view of the UNDP or USAID and is solely the responsibility of the author.
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The focus groups included the following socioeconomic sectors: women from the Mercado Rodriguez,
middle class entrepreneurs, working class men and women from El Alto, entrepreneurs from El Alto,
students from the Colegio Ayacucho, university students from El Alto, workers at the beer factory, and
upper class men and women from the southern neighborhoods of La Paz. The study also relies on Mitchell
Seligson’s “” and several monthly surveys performed by Apoyo.
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BACKGROUND TO THE CVA UPDATE
The original CVA reports a more detailed analysis is provided about the background
leading to the crisis of 2003 that led to the writing of this update. For purposes of this
update only a brief description of the background will be provided. 2 The June 30, 2002
elections have generally been described as a threshold moment in Bolivian history
because of the emergence of so called anti-systemic or “social” parties such as the
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and the Movimiento Indio Pachacuti (MIP). This
study’s key assumption is that threshold moments are not distinguishable events but
processes that often end as silently as they began. In Bolivia’s case, the threshold
moment defined as a significant period in which the essence of political relations
changed, probably peaked in the year 2000. The 2002 elections merely capped a longer
process that is ongoing and which could culminate a very different Bolivia than the one
prior to 2000.
Be that as it may, the 2002 elections were a non-conclusive electoral round characterized
by a virtual three-way tie among the MAS, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement
(MNR) and the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR). The extremity of the positions among
these three principal political actors produced a very fragmented and weak ruling
coalition among the MNR, the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria and the Unidad
Cívica Solidaridad (UCS). In this context the poor electoral performance of traditional
parties such as the MIR and Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) was of particular
note because they had been since 1985 the pillar of Bolivia’s “pacted” democracy. The
fragmented nature of the ruling coalition also exacerbated the need to rely on traditional
mechanisms of patronage and clientelism. Thus the new government spent much of its
time in office during the first 10 months handing out jobs to members of the coalition.
While the ruling coalition fought over posts, Bolivia became mired in a vast web of social
conflicts which were strengthened by a new congressionally based opposition headed by
the MAS but that also included to a greater or lesser extent parties such as the MIP and
even the NFR. In the words of Evo Morales, the leader of the MAS, this coalition would
take to governing from the streets because together they represented the majority of
Bolivians who had voted in the June elections.
In this particular array of forces, the key question for this study was whether the five
areas of conflict identified above (institutional, economic, land, coca/cocaine, and citizen
and public security) would be resolved, minimized or exacerbated. Given the pattern of
interaction between the MNR- led government and the MAS-led opposition, Bolivia’s
overall vulnerability to conflict was high from the beginning and the probability that
conflict would break out immediately was also high. At the same time, however, the
2002 national elections presented a curious blend of vulnerability to conflict and a
window of opportunity for conflict mitigation.
2

This background is based on a daily monitoring of the following newspapers: La Razon and La Prensa
from La Paz, Los Tiempos from Cochabamba, El Deber and El Mundo from Santa Cruz, and El Correo del
Sur from Sucre. It is also derived from interviews with key political actors, analysts, and officials from
foreign assistance missions. Any errors of interpretation are solely the responsibility of the author.
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Bolivia’s vulnerability to conflict in 2002-2003 is dependent on the degree to which the
strategies of the government and the MAS are successful. In a nutshell, the government’s
strategy was to isolate sources of conflict and to deal with each social sector individually.
This conflict management strategy presupposes that addressing each conflict on its own
terms (the equivalent of stamping out small brush fires) will prevent the emergence of a
national and uncontrolled, though organized, process of social mobilization. The MAS in
contrast has conducted a “concurso de acreedores” as President Sánchez de Lozada has
described the strategy. In other words, the MAS attempted to incorporate every possible
source of opposition to the government into a nationwide movement. While these
strategies appeared headed toward an inevitable collision, the first six months suggested
that the most likely pattern over the next few years would be a continuation of the
precarious ritual of negotiations leading to temporary ways out of crisis.
The two sides of the conflict represented by the MAS and the government are also
severely impacted by at least three other important forces. The outcome of the
confrontation between them will depend on how much influence these forces can exert on
the decision- making process. The most significant source of external pressure is the role
of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and that of the United States. In the case of the former, IMF pressures to
pursue a specific policy direction will inevitably have an impact on the ability of the
government to manage conflict and the opposition’s capacity to mobilize nationally.
Pressures from the U.S. are tied specifically to the eradication of coca. As will be
discussed in the scenarios outlined, this is an area of grave risk as conflict has often been
violent.
Regional and economic interest groups present a second source of tensions. Regional
groups include movements such as the Santa Cruz and Tarija civic committees, and
“nationalistic” forces such as Nación Camba and others, which promote the defense of
their specific departmental economic interests. A few promote troubling, racially- tinged
messages aimed at the indigenous groups in western Bolivia. While they appear
relatively autonomous, these sectors are closer to the government. Many individuals
interviewed by the CVA team claimed that these sectors had managed to establish a
“colony inside of the cabinet.” Economic interest groups include business associations,
which would like to see the government implement economic policies that protect their
interests. These groups, including the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de
Bolivia (CEPB), are classic pressure groups with significant influence over the
government.
A final source of pressure comes from the media, which includes print, radio, and
television. A recurrent theme among politicians interviewed by the CVA team was that
an autonomous media-based opposition (oposición mediática) exerted an unusual degree
of influence and was a significant source of conflict. The media have indeed been
extremely active and critical of government policy and also of the MAS and other
opposition groups. The more difficult issue has to do with the emergence of media
conglomerates controlled by individuals with key economic interests. In any event, the
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media have become major foci of demands that can either deepen or help reduce conflict
in Bolivia.
This pattern is presented graphically in Figure 1
Figure 1
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During the six months analyzed in the original CVA, the government successfully
delayed the outbreak of conflict. At the same time, however, government officials
realized that the strategy to separate potential sources of conflict was difficult to sustain
and one that would inevitably explode. This inevitability exploded first on January 13,
when the government predictably squared off against the MAS and the cocaleros in the
Chapare region over the eradication issue. The confrontation was predictable, as Evo
Morales and the MAS had been announcing road blockades, strikes, and overall
mobilization since November 2002. Thus the surprise was not that the cocaleros
challenged the government; it was the intensity of the confrontation and the tragic results
of two weeks of violence between government forces and the MAS led cocaleros. It also
became somewhat clear that the MAS was closer to achieving its aim of forging a
national movement that expanded the conflict areas than the government was to
successfully dividing the opposition. This new national movement came to be embodied
in the so-called Estado Mayor del Pueblo, a play on the command structure of the
Bolivian armed forces. Evo Morales, of course, appeared as the commander in chief of
the Estado Mayor, which aimed to give structure to the national movement spearheaded
by the MAS.
The January government-cocalero confrontation led to yet another Church and
Defensoría del Pueblo mediated agreement. The substance of the agreement involved
promises to conduct a study on legal coca, to pause eradication programs, and to conduct
only voluntary eradication programs in the Yungas, among others. The agreements came
only after long and difficult ne gotiations that further backed the government into a corner
and restricted its ability to design policy in this area.
If coca policy was the first conflict area that exploded, it was also clear that as soon as the
government announced a major economic plan, opposition forces writ large would
mobilize against the government. Thus, when the government announced that it had sent
to Congress a bill introducing a 12.5% income tax program that vast sectors, especially
the working class, demonstrated against the plan. The overwhelming popular rejection of
the government’s economic program in February 2003 is the most tangible expression of
this crisis. The unrest, however, did not come from the working class per se or even from
the MAS. Instead, the National Police mutinied and launched an unprecedented assault
on the presidential palace on February 12. The armed forces responded setting off a
firefight between the two institutions charged with the legitimate use of force in Bolivia.
For the next two days, the cities of La Paz and to a lesser extent Cochabamba, were
engulfed in violence. In the end, over thirty people were dead and the government was
left barely hanging onto power.
In the aftermath of the crisis a search began for those who provoked the violence. Most
cast the blame on the government’s proposed economic plan, or on its reliance on the
military to restore order. The government argued that a coup had in fact occurred,
although the president’s own spokesperson gave little credence to these claims. The
police, who had started the confrontation by shooting at the presidential palace, emerged
as the principal victim because over a dozen officers died in the skirmish with the
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military. 3 The government called on the Organization of American States (OAS) to
examine the incident. At the same time, it also called on FBI ballistics experts to help
with the investigation. The OAS presented its conclusions in April, casting all blame on
the police for starting the fight and noting that the military had fulfilled its constitutional
duty to defend democracy.
In early 2003, conflict appeared to focus solely on coca and the economy, two of the five
areas analyzed by the CVA. The remaining conflicts appeared simply to be dimensions
of these two broad themes. The institutional area, for example, was serious and in large
measure the single most important reason why economic reforms never really took hold
in Bolivia. Questions of land tenure and use were still significant and possibly the
principal detonating factors for major conflict in Bolivia. Perhaps the most visible
conflict area was the public security area. The February 12-13 riots revealed the
overwhelming presence of what appeared to be urban youth gangs bent on vandalizing
any private property in sight. It also gave credence to the assumption that social
mobilization in Bolivia appears to be closely linked to the explosion of crime waves.
The January coca confrontation and the February riots convinced the government that
there were only two issues--coca policy and the economy-- which it had to address in the
short term. The government recognized the remaining conflict areas but its capacity to
respond to the land question, the criminality issue, and the institutional problems was
limited at best. This was the reality of Bolivia in mid 2003; thus, to expect the
government to resolve multiple issues simultaneously was unreasonable. It is also
unlikely that even with the best of intentions and the support of the international
community, the go vernment can begin to address the coca and economic issues that are at
the core of current instability.
In 2003 the most likely scenario for the foreseeable future is of precarious stability rooted
in the weakness of the State and the inability of the Bolivian government to exert
authority even within its own ostensible coalition. The weakness of the State was made
most evident in the severe armed confrontation between the military and the police. To a
certain extent the February 12 firefight was evidence that the State had lost its legitimate
monopoly over the use of force. In Bolivia’s current context, one of the critical
challenges faced by the Sánchez de Lozada government is to reclaim legitimate control
over the state security institutions, especially the police.
The February crisis also reflected that Bolivia’s highly praised “pacted democracy” had
run its course. The political parties, especially those in the ruling coalition, played a
predictably disappointing role. They disappeared from the political scene and left
President Sánchez de Lozada to fend for himself. The principal problem with the crisis
of pacted democracy is that in Bolivia’s current context, a weak ruling coalition neither
controls the legislature effectively nor is it capable of producing a regime-supporting
social pact or truce. In contrast to the environment of pacted democracy between 1985
3

This conclusion follows the OAS report on the February incidents. Interviews with government officials
and members of the opposition suggest that this interpretation is essentially correct. Focus group results
with students from the Ayacucho school who participated in the riot confirm this version.
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and 2000, where control of the legislature was sufficient, governability today also
requires control over a highly mobilized civil society. Given this context, there are very
clear and defined limits to what the government can do in Bolivia.
The party sentiment in Bolivia became dramatically reflected in the attacks on the
headquarters of the ADN, MNR, and MIR, the parties that go verned Bolivia since 1985.
These assaults gave credence to those who claimed that the whole thing was orchestrated
by the MAS and other opposition groups. While the attacks were perhaps not as
spontaneous as some would have it, the fact is that the symbolism of burning down these
headquarters was huge. Focus-group results reveal a deep-seated sentiment that the
traditional parties and their corrupt ways were responsible for Bolivia’s problems and
they simply had to go.

Figure 2

Chronology of Events 12-13 February, 2003
06.00 HRS.

10.16 HRS.

The demands • Alberto
The protest • Around 100
Gasser, Minister of
persons protested at the plaza
Government, Edgar Pardo, the Murillo. Near noon, students
commander of the Police, and from the colegio Ayacucho
José Luis Harb, the vice
stoned the government
minister of the Interior, met
palace. A large number of
with mutinied members of the military men attempted to
police at the Grupo Especial
disperse the demonstrators
de Seguridad building. The
using tear gas and pellets.
police representatives
The police also mutinied in
submitted 30 demands to the Tarija and Cochabamba.
government. At 09.00
Oruro waited but was alert.
President Sánchez de Lozada
convoked his cabinet to
analyze the social situation in
country.

14.00 HRS.

16.30 HRS.

Cross fire • The first death is The message • Gonzalo
confirmed as a result of the
Sánchez de Lozada addresses
battle between the army and the nation. He announces the
the police. An hour later, the revocation of the tax bill or
military forces retreat to the impuestazo. Immediately the
government palace, where the leaders of the NFR and MAS
wounded are tended in the
parties speak of reducing the
main hallway. At that point
president’s term. At almost
the wounded numbered more 17:00 hours a horde burns
than 30. The Plaza Murillo is the Ministry of Labor and
declared a military zone. A
other public and private
presidential message is
buildings.
announced for 15.00 hours.

12.06 HRS.
The clash • Personnel at the
Parliament was evacuated
fearing that demonstrators
would overrun the building.
The battle between police and
the military intensified. At
13.30 the Minister of the
Presidency justifies the
presence of the military and
assures that a dialogue is
underway. Outside gunfire
erupts.

17.53 HRS.
The retreat • The President
orders the Armed Forces and
the Police, through their
respective commanders, to pull
back their respective units.
The leader of the MAS, Evo
Morales, calls for road
blockades until the president
resigns.
The commander of the police
arrives at GES headquarters
where two dead policemen are
lying in wake.

9

18.30 HRS.

19.22 HRS.

00.30 HRS.

The destruction •
Demonstrators overrun the
state run television station.
The MNR, UCS and MIR
houses are burned and
ransacked. A throng of
people stones the Bolivisión
Network. The Armed Forces
patrol the streets of La Paz
but the anger is
uncontainable. Fires and
vandalism prevail throughout.

Mourning • The Police
demands the resignation of
Ministers Gasser and Sánchez
Berzain owing to the death of
six of its members. The
Mayor’s building in El Alto,
Electropaz, Aguas del Illimani,
and tollbooth are burned
down. Another group takes
the beer factory and yet
another burns a ministry.

The calm • Finally fatigue and
the military are able to detain
the demonstrations. Some of
the most violent riots occurred
in Cochabamba. The
Commander of the Police
resigns but the president
ratifies him in the post. The
streets of La Paz are almost
empty. They appear desolate.

Source: La Razón February 14, 2003.

In the post February 2003 context, it became ever more clear that all social and political
actors in Bolivia are redefining strategies and weighing their loyalty to the system. In
this sense, the question is not whether the government of President Sánchez de Lozada
has popular support. As can be seen in Figure 3, the government has never been popular
and it has faced an uphill battle from the outset. The more significant problem in Bolivia
is declining support for all political actors. The opposition (in the current context this
involves the MAS and the NFR), is also unpopular and its declining popularity appears
perversely tied to the dilemmas facing the ruling coalition. It may be premature to state
that the average Bolivian may not like the government, but it also fears the turmoil,
instability and uncertainty that is offered by the opposition.
The original CVA argued that bringing the MAS into the system, through the elections of
June 2002, was one of the most significant accomplishments of Bolivia’s democracy
because of the message of incorporation that it sent to vast sectors of the country’s
excluded majorities. At the same time, we argued that the greatest challenge to Bolivia’s
democracy in the foreseeable future would be to keep the MAS in the system. Following
the February events, this challenge has been even more daunting. It is still clear that if
anti-systemic forces within the MAS prevail, the situation in Bolivia could dramatically
change in the next few years toward greater turmoil and instability. Interviews with party
leaders, however, suggest to us that there are significant sectors within the MAS that
would like to work within the system and who believe that their party can achieve the
presidency and consolidate its grip nationally through electoral means. Like the
government, the MAS faces declining popularity and its long-term success depends on
the extent to which the strategy of establishing a national base is not undermined by the
short term tactics of road blockades, strikes, and other such measures. Focus-group
results reveal that Bolivians have already become tired of these tactics and are beginning
to lose patience with the opposition as well.

Figure 3
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The more difficult issue facing Bolivia has to do with the declining legitimacy of
democracy. Loyalty to the system has declined, as evidenced not only by the repeated
calls for unconstitutional ways out of the crisis by the opposition, but also by the
increasing support for authoritarianism and coups. In other words, the country is trapped
between calls for an authoritarian response to end the turmoil and the demands for a
profound structural change.
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Figure 4
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This update has benefited from a series of focus groups conducted by the Human
Development Team at the UNDP in La Paz and several nationwide surveys in the
aftermath of the February 12-13 riots. The focus group results confirm the overall
perception of decay and declining democratic legitimacy. The government is perceived
as incapable of resolving the current crisis and is seen as only worsening matters when it
does indeed make policy announcements. Politicians and their parties are perceived as
corrupt, and distrust of politicians is profound. Residents of La Paz in particular, express
a deep sense of distrust and uncertainty about the future. Focus group respondents across
a broad range of social classes sensed that no solutions are possible and that the
government is simply doing more of the same. In this sense, there is a deep-rooted fear
that the future holds no promise. Not surprisingly, individuals believe emigration is the
preferred way out of the situation. Like other Latin Americans who are fleeing turmoil
and economic uncertainty, Bolivians are emigrating by the thousands in search of better
futures.
At the same time, however, respondents expressed a hope that a social pact preceded by
the resignation of the current government could help the country overcome the crisis.
The view that the president must step aside to give way to a regime saving alternative
was expressed repeatedly. President Sánchez de Lozada is widely seen as a man
incapable of convoking a national social pact because he is the principal source of
tension. Even the most sophisticated analysts in Bolivia simplistically believe that
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Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation would quickly give way to leadership capable of
addressing the severe economic crisis and the coca issue.
The call for the president’s resignation are usually followed by repeated calls for a
constituent assembly that would correct flaws in the constitution that are perceived as the
root of all problems in Bolivia. A survey of the outcome of similar constituent
assemblies around the Andean region reveals that problems were not resolved and may
have in contrast been exacerbated. Among the most significant results is the
disappearance or weakening of party systems to the point that either too much power
became concentrated in the executive branch, such as in Peru and Venezuela, or the
parties were so weak that presidents can hardly govern, as in Ecuador and Colombia
under Samper and Pastrana. In any event, the mechanisms for constitutional change in
Bolivia are fortunately long and complex; unless these are changed, the constitutional
convention alternative is unlikely to take place. The cautious mechanisms for
constitutional reform in Bolivia, however, have also led to calls for “regime saving”
unconstitutional options for change. Like most of the world’s presidential systems,
Bolivia’s lacks mechanisms to overcome severe government crises without rocking the
foundations of the democratic regime.
Figure 5
February Crisis
GOVERNABILITY
GOVERNABILITY CRISIS

The government is incapable
of resolving problems and
when it acts it worsens things
Faith crisis, individualism,
anger, loss of control,
insecurity, fear, lack of
commnication , distrust, and
aggression
Corrupt Political parties and
institutions
Dependence on the US and
the War in Iraq has worsened
problems in Bolivia

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE
FUTURE

No solutions for the
future; it is simply more
of the same
Option A: Emigrate
Option B. Change of
government, dialogue.
Option C: Individual
Withdrawal

POLITICAL VACUUM
Source: Proyecto PNUD F. Calderon y E. Gamarra, ”Crisis, Inflexion y Reforma del Sistema de
Partidos en Bolivia”

Focus results reveal an important sense of support for democracy. The average Bolivian
appears to be especially concerned with the need for leadership capable of orchestrating
an uncertainty ending social pact. A majority of Bolivians believes that the only way out
of the current situation is to reach such a regime saving pact. They argue that the only
way to achieve such a pact is through the president’s resignation.
Nearly a third believes that Bolivia requires a strong-armed leader.
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Figure 6

What type of leadership
leadership does
does the country
require?

2% 4%
That
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70%
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24%

Source: Proyecto PNUD F. Calderon y E. Gamarra, ”Crisis, Inflexion y Reforma del
Sistema de Partidos en Bolivia”

Given these perceptions, it is not surprising that the only institution capable of moving
the country toward a social pact is the Catholic Church. Between February and June,
Church leadership attempted to bring together all sectors. Significant advances were
made toward the convocation of a national dialogue, a process that appears repeatedly in
surveys and focus groups as necessary to overcome the crisis. Every time it appeared as
though a meeting would occur, oppositio n political parties opted out. In mid 2003, the
hope that a national dialogue will occur ha been slowly dissipating. If such a national
dialogue does occur, it will likely not be until the latter part of the year.
In mid 2003, the government appears to have survived the worst moments of Bolivian
democracy. It has sought to dissipate tensions by supporting calls for a national dialogue.
It signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF despite backing down from its February new
tax plan. Economic indicators are still very weak, but overall the economy has reached a
point where severe downturns are unlikely. Calls for the president’s resignation continue
but even these have toned down as the opposition parties realize that their own popularity
has declined. It also appears that the uncertainty of a rapid and unconstitutional transition
has produced fears that the president’s resignation would only lead to greater turmoil. In
sum, precarious stability is the most likely scenario for the foreseeable future.
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CONFLICT S CENARIOS FOR BOLIVIA
SCENARIOS FOR CONFLICT IN THE COUNTER -NARCOTICS ARENA
During its first ten months in office, the Sanchez de Lozada government faced the
complex legacy of the combination of the deterioration of political authority left by the
previous administration, and the forceful coca eradication efforts under the rubric of Plan
Dignidad. Caught in the middle of this logic are USAID’s Alternative Development
Programs and US policy more generally. Following the 2002 elections, the government
was forced to make serious policy decisions to avert the further erosion of stability. The
decisions involved a complex negotiation process that the government initiated with Evo
Morales and the six coca producers unions or federations in the Chapare region. Given
the June 30 results, it is clear that the government had no alternative but to enter into
conversations with the MAS and the coca growers.
From the government’s perspective, ten basic issues were at the core of the negotiations:
1) the presence of military and police forces in eradication efforts; 2) the number of
hectares of coca required for legal consumption of the coca leaf in Bolivia; 3) a pause in
eradication; 4) alternative development efforts; 5) the establishment of a special
economic zone; 6) marketing and promotion of alternative development products; 7) land
titling; 8) the development of basic services in the Chapare; 9) human rights and justice;
and 10) the modification of Law 1008.
Progress in three of these areas led many to contemplate the possibility of a peaceful way
out of the conflictive dynamic that has characterized the coca/cocaine sector for over two
decades. The government was prepared to replace military and police forces with
civilians in eradication efforts, although it refused to remove security forces from the
Chapare. Coca growers considered this a major victory, as government security forces
involved in eradication efforts were seen as human rights violators. They also perceived
this concession as a major step away from what they claimed was an ongoing military
buildup in the region. If military and police forces were to be removed from the
eradication efforts, their role in the broader counter-drug areas, such as the seizure of
cocaine labs, precursor chemicals, and the arrest of campesinos accused of involvement
in the production of cocaine would continue to be the main use.
Government and coca grower negotiators agreed that a new national survey of the use of
licit coca was necessary, but disagreed as to which institution would actually carry it out.
MAS leaders and the coca producers federation were suspicious of U.S. institutions,
including universities. Instead, they proposed that Bolivian universities conduct the
study. From the perspective of the coca growers, the study would resolve once and for all
the number of hectares required for legal consumption. The current figure of 12,000
hectares required is based on a 1980s calculation by Carter and Mamani, in their seminal
study on coca in Bolivia. A U.S.-funded study widely rejected by the coca growers
calculated a lower number. Moreover, Law 1008 which established the framework for
current eradication policy, was the last time that any such calculation was made. Coca
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growers argued that demand for legal coca had grown considerably since the 1980s,
including increases in the northern Argentine market and an offer from China to
commercialize coca tea. 4
One of the coca growers principal advisers, historian Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, argued in
interviews with the CVA team that 29,000 hectares were required to meet the fastgrowing national and international demand for coca. She rejected previous U.S.- funded
studies, which estimated that the demand for the legal use of coca in Bolivia could be met
with fewer than 10,000 hectares cultivated annually. The key to understanding the coca
growers’ position on this issue is that, for the cocaleros, a pause in eradication efforts
(not in replanting) was a condition sine qua non for the study to be conducted. 5
Assuming that a study were to be conducted, it is highly unlikely that the results would
resolve the situation. If the study finds that far less than the 29,000 hectares are required
for legal consumption, campesino efforts are unlikely to pursue an aggressive campaign
to eradicate the surplus. If, on the other hand, far more hectares were needed for legal
consumption, U.S. policy would become problematic. Toward the end of this
investigation, it appeared that negotiators for the coca growers would accept an
institution such as the UNDP to conduct the study. By mid 2003, however, this
possibility was also rejected.
Eradication efforts were at the center of the negotiation, and all other dimensions were
dependent on this issue. The coca growers’ federations demanded a pause in eradication
until the new demand survey could be completed. Conversely, the government raised
expectations that such a pause could be achieved. President Sanchez de Lozada’s trip to
Washington in mid-November 2002, however, confirmed that the U.S. would not look
kindly on any reversal of eradication efforts, especially after the dramatic announcements
of eradication successes by the previous Bolivian administration. Upon his return to
Bolivia, Sanchez de Lozada announced that no pause in eradication would be permitted.
In response, the MAS and the coca growers announced that they would remain vigilant
and would organize protests. 6 Indeed the MAS, organized protests, marches, and road
blockades and conflict ensued in mid January 2003.
If a pause in eradication raised fears of renewed conflict, then the discussion regarding
alternative development raised hopes that a U.S.- led counter drug program would tolerate
a change in the very concept of alternative deve lopment. Coca grower negotiators called
for a more participatory alternative development program that would provide assistance
to all campesinos in the region, and not exclude those belonging to the MAS and the
4

A DIRECO source claimed that around 2 tons of Yungas coca are consumed in northern Argentina.
According to Oscar Coca, the chief negotiator for the coca growers, they proposed the right to grow half a
hectare of coca per campesino family or the equivalent of 12,000 hectares. After the study, the figure could
be adapted up or down.
6
Oscar Coca claims that at the beginning of the negotiations the government came in with “a speech that
contemplated the real possibility of a pause, and for that reason we broke into commissions.” Toward the
end of the year, however, Coca claimed that the commissions had been a waste of time, that they had
reached their limit and that there was nothing more left to discuss. Nevertheless, conversations with lowerranking government officials continued.
5
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federations. They also argued for developme nt assistance to be channeled through the
municipalities in the Chapare, which together form a joint association or Mancomunidad.
Finally, the negotiators proposed an alternative development program tied more to
industrial job development than the promotion of agricultural exports. Coca growers,
however, were not entirely keen on this notion, as they claimed that the tropical zones in
the Chapare are not apt for industrial development. Despite the debate about which
direction to take, this appeared to be the one area where progress could occur and conflict
minimized.
In the first version of the CVA, we correctly predicted that the most likely source of
conflict would be in the coca-cocaine area. Almost immediately after the year began, the
long announced mobilization by the MAS got under way. The detonating factor, as
expected, was the announcement that US financed coca eradication programs would
continue apace, although eradication had in fact slowed down but never fully halted. The
MAS and cocaleros initiated roadblocks in mid-January that soon led to violent
confrontation between the military and police force that were charged with clearing the
roads and the cocaleros. In the end, approximately 20 people, mainly coca growers, died
as a direct result of the confrontation.
In the midst of this confrontation, Evo Morales launched a new strategy aimed at forging
a national basis of support that transcended his cocalero constituency and that would cut
across ethnic, racial, regional, and issue specific barriers. To secure this aim, the
cocalero leader announced the establishment of a so-called “Estado Mayor del Pueblo.”
However one examines this Estado Mayor, the most telling aspect was its attempt to
structure a national coalition that challenged the legal framework of Bolivia’ fragile
democracy. The worrisome dimension of this Estado Mayor was its obvious anti-system
overtone that overtly called for the armed resistance to state law enforcement efforts,
especially counternarcotics laws.
The January explosion resulted in a significant period of Church-sponsored negotiations.
By early February, an agreement was achieved, although it was based on a very tenuous
set of principles, including calls for the study on the legal and traditional uses of coca.
The agreement, however, proved to be only a temporary cease-fire. From the perspective
of the MAS and the cocaleros, their Estado Mayor was still in place and ready to
challenge at any given moment the system’s military Estado Mayor.
The Estado Mayor in fact consolidated. Moreover, the Chapare moved closer to
becoming a type of “zona de despeje” where the presence of the State was precarious and
where the MAS effectively dominated the region. As a de facto zona de despeje,
eradication and alternative development efforts were temporarily halted. Some
alternative development posts and campesinos involved in them were the target of violent
attacks by cocaleros.
The January conflict also coincided with the first public pronouncement of a rag tag
guerrilla group that called itself the Ejército de Dignidad Nacional (EDN). The EDN is
not important; however, it did lead to significant concern about the possibility that an
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armed insurgency could occur in the Bolivian coca growing regions. Along these lines,
the original CVA noted rumors of FARC presence in the Chapare were widespread but
largely unfounded. The presence of other foreign groups became a major source of
concern when the police arrested Francisco Cortez, who is a member of the Colombian
ELN, and two cocalero leaders. Cortez’s arrest revealed a direct connection between
certain sectors of the cocalero movement and Colombian insurgent groups. One should
not make too much of the ELN presence in Bolivia, although Cortez had with him a
manua l for ELN activities in the country. It is probably far fetched to claim, as some US
officials have, that his presence is proof that the Colombian conflict has expanded to
Bolivia. No other ELN member has been arrested, which suggests that Cortez may have
been only a former member of the guerrilla group and not part of an organized strategy
for Bolivia. Cortez claims to be a human rights worker in Colombia, although he had
trouble explaining why he had eight kilos of cocaine at the time of his arrest. Moreover,
the cocalero leaders arrested with Cortez had a long record of visiting Colombia.
Peñaranda, one of the cocaleros, was involved in attacks against alternative development
offices in the Chapare.
Evo Morales indeed articulated an international network during this very time period to
provide his MAS with a significant amount of symbolic and material support. Morales
spent much of the first six months of 2003 traveling around the globe. He visited Japan,
Europe, and Venezuela among other countries. In Venezuela, Morales became clearly
aligned with the Bolivarian movement. In his speech before an audience of worldwide
supporters of President Chavez and his movement, Morales argued that the time had
come to change the government in Bolivia. The international support for the MAS and
Evo Morales has given the movement resources to expand and consolidate. At the same
time, it is not clear to what extent Morales indeed controls the groups he has mobilized.
Whenever a booby trap injures or kills a soldier, Morales argues that his “base” has
overcome his ability to control its action. In other words, he believes that at times he has
no ability to control the more radical elements within his party and within the sixcocalero federations in the Chapare. Despite these claims, however, Evo Morales was reelected as the principal leader of the Chapare federations in June.
Along with Evo Morales’ re-election, certain trends within the structure of the Estado
Mayor del Pueblo suggest that the government will face increasingly more hostile
challenges. In May 2003, for example, the Estado Mayor del Pueblo met in the city of
Sucre to determine its future stance. The anti-government and anti-regime tone
dramatically escalated, as did calls for armed resistance to government policies. It could
be argued that the Estado Mayor del Pueblo is evidence of the successful establishment
of a national movement with broad international sources of support. It is more difficult to
make the case, however, that coca has ceased to be the core element of the Estado Mayor.
Instead, it appears that the coca issue is still the dominant force within the MAS and that
it dictates the direction of the Estado Mayor del Pueblo. With this updated background,
three scenarios appear possible in Bolivia.
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Scenario 1.1. Eradication and conflict (High Probability)
Following U.S. directives and international agreements signed by the government, the
Sanchez de Lozada administration attempts to pursue eradication policies at the rate of
the previous five years under Plan Dignidad. This will result in an extended period of
conflict, which will be handled with difficulty by military and police forces, especially
after the February 12-13 events. Eradication has already suffered major interruptions,
but given the Bolivian government’s resolve, U.S. economic assistance will continue and
the GOB could ostensibly obtain additional resources to not only pursue Plan Dignidad
but also perhaps deepen alternative development strategies.
Under this scenario, the aborted dialogue initiated with the six coca growers’ federations
in the Chapare would come to a halt, and Evo Morales and the MAS would mobilize a
national protest that would test the strength, breadth and depth of his electoral coalition.
Morales and his movement have learned important lessons from previous mobilization
efforts, and are aware that, to launch a successful campaign, any national effort must take
into account important religious holidays and the planting and harvesting seasons. Such a
campaign would likely include road blockades, strikes, vigils, and other forms of social
protest. The success of this effort would also greatly depend on Morales’ ability to
expand the scope of the conflict to include other issues and groups. As noted earlier,
Morales has already become the most significant anti-globalization spokesperson in
Bolivia and has developed a regional reputation. As head of MAS, he has also made the
land issue a significant concern of his movement. Because land is such a significant
crosscutting issue, it could indeed become the glue that holds together a national coalition
against the government’s eradication efforts. Finally, the MAS has become the principal
force behind efforts to resist natural gas sales to the U.S. through a Chilean port. Morales
has become the single most important leader for all of these issues, and he could
ostensibly bring them all together into one large anti- government coalition.
The original CVA assumed that the length of the conflict could be assumed to be brief
because only about 10,000 hectares remain in the Chapare. At the same time, the CVA
noted that the intensity of the conflict would be very high and could escalate to extreme
proportions. Conflict of this magnitude could also potentially spread into the Yungas
region, despite agreements in place to suspend the forceful eradication of crops in that
region. Other differences with the Yungas would not matter, since Morales has worked
hard to craft an alliance with farmers there as well. The Yungas alliance appears to be
more significant in mid 2003 than in December 2002.
Taking into account the size of the congressional delegation that is made up of groups
that favor ending eradication campaigns in the Chapare, it is unlikely that the government
would find a sympathetic ear in the legislature. If lives are lost and human rights are
violated, then the repercussions of such a confrontation could spill over into other areas.
In the current period, the absence of a Human Right s Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo)
may lead to calls for swifter action against the coca growers. It would not, however, limit
the action of international NGOs that are monitoring the situation in Bolivia closely.
Under this scenario, even international outcry is unlikely to lead to a mediated solution.
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Mediation would inevitably be accompanied by calls for a softening of eradication
programs and for greater economic compensation for eliminating illicit crops.
One of the more difficult areas for the government would involve maintaining a stable
coalition. With the MIR split into two visible factions and vying for survival, plus a
significant electoral space in the 2004 municipal elections and the 2007 presidential
elections, this party could well leave the ruling coalition when the going gets rough on
this issue. Maintaining support for the ruling coalition if the government embarks on an
all out effort to eradicate and control coca growers will be a difficult task. It will be an
even harder task to expand the coalition to bring in groups like the NFR, which would
most likely initiate actions by the opposition aimed at securing the resignation of the
President.
In this scenario of giving priority to stable relations with the U.S., which would be driven
mainly by the coca/cocaine issue and the fear of sanctions from Washington, the results
would polarize Bolivia and could result in an extensive process of cocalero unrest and
mobilization. Rural mobilization would inevitably also seek urban support around the
nationalistic anti-U.S. banner. In this context of severe conflict, the government would
tend to “demonize” the opposition and social movements, linking coca production with
narcotics trafficking and terrorism. This would make for an argument very congruent
with current security thinking in the U.S.
With these antecedent conditions, Bolivian leaders might be inclined to follow the same
tone and attitude that characterized the previous Banzer-Quiroga period, where few
discrepancies with U.S. officials were visible. That pattern of relations, which was
effective between 1997 and 2002, may now result in increased conflict and confrontation
as it envisions little room for dialogue and negotiation. This scenario presupposes a very
high political cost for the GOB, and will test the limits of Bolivian democracy.
Scenario 1.2. Coca no es Cocaína: Replanting and violence (Médium
Probability)
Considering the political triumph of social organizations in the 2002 electoral round, the
negotiations that occurred in early February, the aftermath of the February 12-13 riots,
and the establishment of the so-called Estado Mayor del Pueblo, the coca growers’
unions could seize the present moment to actively oppose eradication efforts through socalled self-defens e groups. They would also simultaneously initiate new crop cultivation
in a clear challenge to current Bolivian law. These new crops would become the central
objective of coca growers’ organizations, since alternative development crops have faced
serious difficulties recently as far as their external and internal marketing and
commercialization are concerned.
For this reason, the Chapare would become a zone without effective state control, and
military and police forces would be forced to leave owing to the high cost (even in lives)
of facing the coca growers’ organizations. This would inevitably lead to a long period of
coca grower radicalism with a very strong dose of anti-U.S. rhetoric. The possibility of
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conflict and violence in coca growing regions would be extremely high. Cocalero
radicalism (coupled with the strength of its congressional delegation) would prevent any
government interdiction effort from going forth successfully. This scenario envisions a
marked delay or even failure in meeting established eradication targets. As a result, the
U.S. would seriously consider imposing sanctions (including de-certification).
Developments in Bolivia would be considered a national security threat and would
validate claims of a relationship between coca growers, drug traffickers and terrorists.
This is a scenario where rumors of significant international presence could become
reality. Evo Morales could, for example, call upon the international connections he has
developed over the past few years within the context of the Foro de Sao Paolo, his
alliance with Venezuela’s Movimiento Boliviariano, and anti- globalization forces. These
groups could provide funding for his activities. Chief among these groups are European
NGOs that do not promote violence but identify with the cocalero movements’ right to
grow coca. In a more extreme version, Morales could seek to strengthen ties with armed
groups in Colombia such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FARC) and with the
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).7
In a scenario of this magnitude, the GOB could lose control of coca growing zones, and
might be forced, owing to internal and external pressures, to intervene militarily in the
coca growing zones of the Chapare and Yungas. Given the weakness of the armed forces
and the National Police, securing control over the Chapare would not be an easy task.
Moreover, a chance exists that the conflict could spill over into the Yungas region,
making it even more difficult for the government to respond. Cocalero resistance might
include a broad coalition of rural and urban groups who would employ tactics such as
road blockades, strikes, and other measures. This would inevitably have a dramatic effect
on the governability of Bolivian democracy.
Scenario 1.3. Negotiations leading to development, peace, democratic
stability and counter-drug efforts (Low Probability)
This scenario assumes that all social actors and the government will be interested in a
genuine negotiation process, which is why it represents only an ideal. For the GOB, it
would signify achieving greater legitimacy and popular support. It would also presuppose an improved ability to negotiate with international actors involved in the
counter-narcotics effort.

7

This is a scenario where much speculation is possible and where rumors become reality. The CVA team
heard many rumors and has treated them as such as it found no evidence to substantiate any of the
numerous versions of Colombian or Venezuelan presence. The most recurring version states that a
“Colombian presumably from the FARC trained a group of 20 cocaleros in the Chapare.” Members of the
Comité Pro Santa Cruz claimed that during a visit to a town bordering on the Chapare townsfolk told them
that a Colombian in wheel chair was the person in charge of training coca growers. Earlier unsubstantiated
rumors appeared in a Washington Times article that claimed that the MAS’s campaign had been funded by
FARC. In a more recent report based on this article Richard Millet states as fact that the FARC funded Evo
Morales. In our view, these rumors have no concrete basis in fact and caution should be used if such
claims are to be used as the basis for policy.
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The GOB would launch a counter- narcotics strategy that would result from negotiations
with these national and international actors. The strategy would involve many of the
successful dimensions of the Plan Dignidad, such as precursor control, among others. At
the same time, however, it wo uld introduce innovative policies in critical tasks such as
reducing the social, political, and economic costs associated with the eradication of coca
crops. One particular area where such change might occur would be in alternative
development programs, especially if new funding mechanisms are found. One possible
route might include working directly through popular participation mechanisms and
through municipal governments in the Chapare. 8
The government would inevitably be forced to explain domestic arrangements to external
actors, especially the U.S., the United Nations Drug Control Program, and the European
Union. This strategy would rely strongly on the persuasion abilities of Bolivian
diplomats and negotiators, who would have to convince foreign governments and funding
agencies that Bolivia was pursuing counter-drug efforts, including the eradication of
coca, under the umbrella of development and within a climate of peace, dialogue and
consensus-building.
In this best-case scenario, the U.S. government and other external actors would recognize
the depth of the political changes that have occurred since the electoral emergence of the
MAS and the MIP. The continuation of a draconian counter-drug strategy based on
interdiction and crop eradication is not viable at a time when social sectors affected by
these measures have the capacity to mobilize and perhaps even paralyze economic
activity in Bolivia.
In this scenario, the will of the Bolivia government and of social organizations to fight
drug trafficking and to eradicate excess coca would be ratified and would send a clear
message to the international community. The real basis of internal consensus would be
determined by the time required and the procedures necessary to achieve Bolivia’s
counter-narcotics goals. To minimize conflict, the government might propose the
eradication of coca under a more flexible timetable, with greater compensation and under
a shared vigilance and control effort with the coca growing organizations themselves.
Achieving this kind of effort would require an agreement a priori with international
actors who might see promise in such an approach.
The development of consensus among the distinct actors involved in this conflict would
allow for the development of prevention mechanisms and the peaceful resolution of
conflicts in coca growing zones. At the same time, the presence of the military and the
police in these regions would be reduced and the threat of confrontation would be
8

An alternative and plausible explanation regarding Evo Morales’ strategy involves a significant degree of
cynicism. Evo and the MAS may not be at all interested in a final resolution to the coca issue as posited in
this paragraph. As we noted in the analytical section of this report, Evo’s long-term strategy is aimed at
taking power by constructing a national movement that would culminate in his election in 2007. Nothing
in the interviews with the MAS and with Evo Morales suggested that the strategy might include nondemocratic means, although our interviewees claimed that the Sánchez de Lozada government was
illegitimate. Events since January 13, 2003, however, suggest that members of the MAS do not discount
non-democratic means to achieve their goal.
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significantly averted. This more flexible eradication effort with compensation, the
establishment of campesino vigilance, and the reduced presence of the military would
have to count on the support of unions in coca growing zones to prevent the planting of
new coca crops and almácigos. It also presupposes that these unions would become
decisively involved in the design, implementation, and institutionalization of alternative
development programs.
This more flexible strategy would inevitably open a complex negotiating process with the
U.S., and serious bilateral tension could result. Given current U.S. government priorities,
it is likely that the initial response from Washington would be to threaten punishment
and/or increase pressure. The starting points for Bolivian negotiators would be social
peace, democratic stability, and sustainable development with respect for human rights,
together with the eradication of illegal coca plantations. They would assume that, if the
country displayed a united internal front with clear objectives, the U.S. might be inclined
to give this strategy a chance to prove itself. The internal benefits of such a strategy
would justify the calculated risk of taking on the U.S. While this is the ideal case
scenario where social peace and democratic stability appear compatible with counterdrug efforts, it is also the most unlikely, as neither internal nor external actors are willing
to accept the assumptions underlying such a strategy.

SCENARIOS FOR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
One of Bolivia’s principal problems historically is the overall weakness of the state. This
is gauged largely by two factors: institutional fragility, and the inability of the state to
establish a presence within the bounds of the national territory. With the exception of the
central government, which grew disproportionately in size to meet the employment needs
of the country’s middle class, the state has had virtually no control over its national
territory, and has struggled with attempts to impose authority in remote corners of the
country. The vastness of the territory, together with the inadequacy of institutions and
resources, made it a virtual impossibility for the state to even consider controlling every
dimension of the country’s geography.
Historically, the country has been plagued by profound regional tensions, pitting the
eastern lowlands against the highlands. Separatist aspirations have always been
attributed to lowlanders from Santa Cruz, whom many accuse of secretly wishing to be
annexed by Brazil. Still others attribute aspirations of an independent republic to the
dwellers of the central valleys of Cochabamba. These regional autonomy disputes are no
different than those that pit Quiteños and Guayaquileños in Ecuador or costeños and
serranos in Peru. Some authors have argued that these traits are sufficient to conclude
that Bolivia has no effective central state.
Thus, before the crises of 2000, the Bolivian state had no real effective control over its
national territory. Carlos Toranzo, a well-known social scientist, noted that as a result of
the explosion of simultaneous social confrontations, the state had ceased to aspire to
control the country’s national territory, even remotely. Moreover, with the declaration by
Felipe Quispe, el Mallku, leader of the Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores
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Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), that the indigenous people do not recognize the
legitimacy of state jurisdiction, the problems of state coherence appear to have become
huge in the short-term. Calls for a Constituent Assembly to re-draft the constitution have
been made in the past three years in an attempt to redefine the state and establish a new
institutional legitimacy.
One of the most salient dimensions of the multiple crises since 2000 was Bolivia’s hardearned efforts at national territorial integration, a basic dimension of state-building, that
ran head on into the resistance of indigenous groups and others involved in the strikes,
blockades and other measures against the government. This was especially evident in the
damage inflicted on the nation’s road infrastructure by striking sectors. The GOB
estimated in late 2000 that it would cost $70 million to clear and fix the country’s roads.
In a country that until very recently believed it could become the transportation nerve
center of South America, this was perceived as a particularly serious blow.
Another important dimension of Bolivia’s contemporary problems has to do with the
political situation of women. While they have generally been subsumed by other civil
society expressions, women’s movements per se have had very little influence in
Bolivian politics despite the fact that the country had a female president in 1979-1980
and that a woman is currently the head of the Senate. The situation of women in Bolivia
simply exacerbates what is generally perceived as an extreme case of social exclusion.
The most dramatic indicators reflecting this reality include: school attendance rates are
lower for women; poor health indices (percentage of births attended by a physic ian and
mortality rates); high female unemployment rates; and the overall low presence of
women in politics.
Progress has been made, however, toward addressing the low level of participation by
women in politics. Under the terms of the current electoral law, for example, a quota
mandates that 30 percent of all political party candidates must be women. As a result, the
overall percentage of women in the national legislature has increased significantly. The
presence of women in the legislature may contribute to improving the overall pattern of
social exclusion in the country. A reasonable assumption is that the greater presence of
women in the legislature will lead to the introduction of gender-based legislation that
may improve the lives of women in Bo livia.
This brief discussion of state weakness in Bolivia serves as a prelude to the real problems
of institutional development, especially in the context of the June 30, 2002 electoral
results. With the arrival of the MAS and the MIP in the national legislature, the future of
Bolivia’s representative democracy rests on the behavior of these two social movements,
which have invaded the territory of political parties. At the same time, the ruling
coalition crafted at the eleventh hour to insure the election of President Sánchez de
Lozada has displayed several weaknesses, demonstrated mainly by bickering over the
distribution of cabinet posts. The institutional setting that emerged from this particular
configuration of forces is complex and will continue to test the limits of Bolivian
democracy.
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At one level, the performance of the cabinet will be tested by the challenge of finding a
workable arrangement among former, bitter political rivals. This will be especially
evident in addressing the economic situation. When the government finally agrees on a
policy direction, imposing policy will be a difficult task that will demand a united front
by all members of the coalition.
At a second level, the new situation provided an interesting relationship between the
executive and the legislative branch, where over 40 percent of the membership has no
previous experience. Apart from the inexperience of most legislators, language barriers
and even problems with basic literacy have already become evident. More importantly,
the MAS and the MIP appear uncomfortable with their legislators and have yet to figure
out what role they are to play and how they are to report to the party and the unions that
constitute the core constituency of at least one of these two parties. The MAS and the
MIP are, in essence, the opposition and they have yet to figure out how to employ
legislative mechanisms to challenge the initiatives of the executive branch.
In the legislature, the ruling coalition has displayed a certain degree of coherence and
discipline, but on occasion members of the MIR and the UCS have publicly expressed
their disagreement over MNR initiatives such as the BONOSOL and the SUMI. In the
end, both parties went along with the MNR, but it became clear that the cohesion of the
legislative wing of the coalition is in question and free lancing deputies and senators
could emerge.
A more basic issue in the legislature is the overall inexperience of the legislators for the
ruling coalition and the opposition. A casual overview suggests that the problems are
graver in the opposition, where a majority has never served in public office. Ongoing
efforts by USAID and other donors appear to simply not be enough to guarantee the
drafting of good bills or the adequate oversight of executive initiatives. It is anyone’s
guess as to how quickly training efforts can have an effect on these new legislators.
However, without significant training, the legislative branch will confirm its role as a donothing institution.
A third level involves the situation with other institutions, such as the judiciary, which
has been dealing with the dramatic new reality created by the implementation of the new
Code of Criminal Procedure. It is clear that the justice system in Bolivia is still
somewhat politicized, but to a much lower degree than in the past. Moreover, justice in
Bolivia has speeded up considerably, with cases being adjudicated at an astounding rate.
Those involved in the justice sector—judges and lawyers in particular—claim that the
new practices will take time to take root.
The more serious issue in the justice sector has to do with the problems associated with
the implementation of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although it has been in place for
only two years, the outcry against the CCP has been extensive, spanning groups such as
the media, law enforcement, the general public, and even practicing judges and lawyers.
Momentum appears to be building toward some sort of modification of the CCP that will,
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in the words of individuals interviewed for this assessment, be friendlier to victims of
crime.
A fourth level involves the National Electoral Court, an institution that USAID funded in
the early 1990s with a modicum of success. Although the NEC survived the
unsubstantiated and even frivolous charges of fraud during the June 30 election, it has
faced the very serious problem of selecting capable individuals to serve. The first court
included a number of “notable” and talented individuals who in the end bickered their
way out of a job. The new court elected another coterie of notables. The resignation of
its new president, an internationally recognized communications scholar, and more
recently of another prominent member of the NEC, suggests that this institution is in
serious trouble. Stabilizing the NEC is a pressing issue to restore the credibility of the
political system.
A fifth critical level has to do with the overall situation at the municipal level seven years
after the implementation of the Popular Partic ipation Law. It is evident that much of the
political energy in Bolivia has shifted to the municipios, and that participation at the
grassroots level has occurred. Criticisms of Popular Participation also abound, ranging
from those who argue that corruption is the only thing that has been decentralized, to
others who claim that beyond building plazas and paving the central square, the transfer
of resources has done little to improve the lot of the average citizen.
USAID’s Democratic Development and Citizen Participation (DPCP/DDPC) program
enjoys a very favorable reputation in the municipios, where it has worked to promote
more effective municipal government and where it has attempted to improve the
representational ability of elected officials, including single- member district deputies.
Program officers claim success even in the Yungas, where coca growers are sympathetic
to the MAS. Bolivia’s municipal governments, now organizing themselves into broader
mancomunidades, are still a ways from becoming effective and productive. Municipios
are still plagued by political tensions within the councils, and the all too common
attempts to recall mayors after only one year in office continue to rock the stability of
local government.
In terms of Bolivia’s local government experience, the most significant area is the
Chapare. USAID’s DDCP program is conspicuously absent from the Chapare where,
arguably, the municipios could be strengthened the most. The Chapare presents a very
difficult challenge in this particular area. On the one hand, it is true that the six cocagrowers’ federations and the MAS govern the municipios. It is also true that voter
turnout during the national election was particularly low in those districts. At the same
time, it is also the case that the MAS won by a rather large proportion. Simply turning
over the municipios to the MAS by denying them what other municipios around the
country have enjoyed appears to be shortsighted at this stage. The basic problem in the
Chapare is the absence of effective and positive state presence to counter the perception
that all the state wants in the region is to repress coca growers.
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The institutional setting in Bolivia suffered severe setbacks since January 2003. The
overall situation deteriorated so much that by late February Bolivian analysts were again
claiming that the State had collapsed and that the country was in a condition of total
anomie. The central dimensions of the collapse can be divided into the following set of
characteristics.
The ruling coalition made strides towards consolidation during its first six months in
office, but the internal bickering was still driven by the typical job patronage politics. In
this sense, one of the main criticism heard repeatedly was that the government had spent
too much time resolving job patronage disputes and not enough on the central business of
governing. The aforementioned situation had serious negative consequences on at least
two dimensions of governance.
First, the economic team within the cabinet was unable to articulate a political plan for
the implementation of any economic recovery plan. As a result, the economic team
operated in a political vacuum and failed to understand the fundamental essence of
Bolivian political economy that economic plans require significant political support to
succeed. In other words, it is not enough to have a good economic plan; the political side
must also be firmly in place. Second, the government failed to effectively employ its
majority control over the legislative branch. For example, it failed to prepare the
political way in Congress before submitting the economic recovery plan that triggered the
February riots. A basic reality of executive legislative relations in Bolivia over the past
fifteen years has been the timely negotiation of the national budget and economic
programs to avert significant showdowns and confrontations with the social sectors
affected by the measures.
The weakness of institutions was exacerbated by the February 12-13 La Paz riots. It
became patently clear that the frail ruling coalition controlled little more than the
patronage posts the parties who comprise it sought. At the same time, it could muster no
authority to control the rioting population. This situation was evident by the vacuum left
by the Sanchez de Lozada government during the long hours following the onset of the
riots. The virtual disappearance of the president, vice president and most members of his
cabinet made the vacuum evident. As the coalition vanished, it also apparently ceased to
function.
This perception was exacerbated by the fact that the National Police effectively led the
rebellion and that the armed forces were the only institution left to protect the presidential
palace and by extension Bolivian democracy. The armed forces did not, as might have
been expected given their coupist past, orchestrate a grab for power in the context of the
vacuum left by the fleeing politicians. Instead they protected the palace, although
charges of out of control snipers tarnished what might otherwise have been considered a
decorous moment. According to interviews conducted since the February riots with
members of the armed forces, only young untrained recruits who had barely entered the
forces weeks earlier were present at the Plaza Murillo. The carnage that resulted from the
confrontation between the military and the police culminated in several very long hours
where neither the police nor the military were around to control looters and other vandals
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who ransacked government ministries. During those long hours, it was perhaps correct to
argue that the Bolivian state and its principal institutions had in fact ceased to function.
Recomposing state authority continues to be the daunting task faced by the severely
weakened Sánchez de Lozada government.
The institutional and power vacuum left by the aftermath of the February riots could have
in effect been filled by the “non loyal” opposition made up of the MAS and the NFR. As
Evo Morales stated, if he had wanted to, the MAS would have moved into the
presidential palace. Instead both Evo Morales and Manfred Reyes Villa made repeated
calls for President Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation. While the differences between
Morales and Reyes Villa are great, they became momentary allies armed with the
objective of ridding Bolivia of Sánchez de Lozada. Four months after the February riots,
both remained committed to the goal to force the president to resign.
Rather than dwelling on the characteristics of the riots, the problems stemming from
those dates are of greater concern for the vulnerability of conflict in Bolivia. First, the
demand that Sánchez de Lozada and his government resign speaks again to a basic
problem of institutional design in presidential systems that lack mechanisms to overcome
governance crisis. With no escape valve and the overall perception that there is no way
that the Bolivian head of state can resist four more years in office, calls for constitutional
reform are seen as the best way out of this particular impasse. This is an ironic twist for
many reasons. In the early 1990s, President Sánchez de Lozada had been one of the
most ardent advocates of the adoption of a parliamentary system that would allow
unpopular leaders to be replaced through recall mechanisms without affecting the overall
stability of the system.
Another critical issue since February has been the need to reassert control over the
National Police and the armed forces. President Sánchez de Lozada argued that his
principal problem was the resolution of the conflict with the police. To do so, the
government proceeded along two cautious fronts. It respected the basic terms of the
agreement signed during the battle by pursuing international assistance for training and to
improve the overall situation of the police. A second strategy was to seek a political
truce with the police by essentially resorting to age-old cooptation tactics. Thus in April,
the president surprised even his other coalition partners by announcing the entry into the
government of VIMA, a party made up of retired police officers who had supported the
anti-government riots. VIMA’s entry stirred a storm of protest within the MIR and
certain groups within the MNR. In the end, the president’s invitation to the VIMA
prevailed.
At least two possible scenarios are possible, given the reality of Bolivian political life.
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Scenario 2.1. MAS and MIP combine parliamentary and street tactics and
accept the rules of representative democracy (Medium
Probability)
This positive scenario would see the MAS and the MIP transform their social movement
unionism into effective mechanisms for the representation of the interests of their
respective constituencies. Both groups would develop a serious legislative agenda,
including the submission of bills for consideration by committees. The result would be
effective and viable policy alternatives sometimes negotiated with the ruling coalition
and the executive branch and with other opposition parties. The MAS and the MIP
would also embark on responsible oversight activities aimed at holding the government
accountable.
This scenario assumes that the health and future of Bolivia’s democracy rests largely on
the transformation of the MAS and the MIP into political parties on the one hand and into
loyal supporters of representative democracy on the other. In this scenario, the MAS and
the MIP would be rewarded for delivering “the bacon” to their constituencies.
This scenario had a better chance of occurring before the February 12-13 riots. In mid
2003, the MAS appears less likely to accept the rules of representative democracy,
although a few sectors within the party are still willing to play the game. The more
radical sectors of the MAS, however, would like to press ahead toward forcing the
resignation of President Sanchez de Lozada. Although the MAS is far from the pattern
of traditional parties, in which internal divisions plague the party structure, serious
divisions exist within the party. This situation favors the radicalization of the party rather
than an acceptance of the parliamentary and electoral route toward power.
The situation is much different within the MIP. Felipe Quispe’s party is deeply divided
and a number of individuals who were once close to him have broken ranks and have
become vocal critics of the Mallku. Quispe is accused not only of having been co-opted
by the government but also of having engaged in a series of corrupt acts. While the MIP
was able to mobilize the Altiplano, it is unlikely that it would be able to do the same or at
least with as much force as before. It is also unlikely that the MIP will move in the short
term toward some kind of acceptance of the rules of the game, as that would further erode
its appeal.
Scenario 2.2. Rejection of the party system by MAS and MIP and return to
street and road blockades (Medium Probability)
A second and more likely scenario would have the MAS and the MIP continue to reject
the party system they have joined, and seek to undermine the basic tenets of
representative democracy from within the legislative branch. In this particular scenario,
the MAS and the MIP would use the National Congress as a protest forum and as an
additional tool to block government policy from within. Deputies and senators of both
parties would abuse the oversight mechanisms of the legislature to block government
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initiatives. At the same time, they would submit few viable bills for consideration;
instead they would dedicate the core of their efforts to block government initiatives.
Under this scenario, the National Congress is transformed into a loudspeaker that would
serve to mobilize popular protest. The MAS and the MIP would use the legislative pulpit
not to present policy alternatives, but to mobilize street protests, road blockades, and even
general strikes. Given the immunity from prosecution that Bolivian legislators enjoy,
deputies and senators from both parties would act with impunity in the name of speaking
for the masses that ushered them into office.
If this scenario were played out, the government would have no chance of preventing the
MAS and the MIP from leading a conspiracy to bring down the system from within. The
resulting executive and legislative impasse could result in the government resorting to
rule-by-decree to overcome the blockade imposed by the MAS and the MIP in the streets
and in the halls of the National Congress. Because massive protests would likely follow
the laws decreed in critical policy areas, the result could, in effect, be an absolute crisis of
governance.
During the first six months of 2003, this scenario has indeed become reality with the
opposition attempting to use oversight mechanisms to not only block government
initiatives but also to investigate the events of February and the role of the armed forces
in particular. At the same time, however, this scenario has not worked as well as the
MAS, MIP and the NFR might have expected. The government has been able to use its
slight congressional majority to render the legislature useless. During the congressional
sessions, few bills have been approved and the opposition has been incapable of pressing
ahead with its select few pieces of proposed legislation. At one point in late May, the
opposition even staged a hunger strike to force the government majority to agree to
include proposed legislation. Policymaking is centered in the executive branch and the
opposition has been unable to convert the legislature in a significant place either for the
treatment of relevant legislation or for a broader discussion about the situation in Bolivia.
Scenario 2.3. Collapse of the ruling coalition and serious crisis of
governability (Medium Probability)
The fragile ruling coalition worked well for the first 100 days of the administration, but
its role was largely limited to a search for consensus regarding policy and the even
distribution of patronage posts between the MNR and the MIR. Overall, the legislative
agenda of the coalition has been limited, and only in early November did long-awaited
policy announcements appear.
The ruling coalition is a strange and fragile assortment of long-term enemies who have
agreed to work together because the prospect of the country’s collapse appeared
imminent in the aftermath of the 2002 elections. This coalition of last resort managed to
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save Bolivian democracy, at least temporarily, and its success will largely be determined
by the cohesion these erstwhile political enemies are able to develop. 9
A possible scenario of coalition collapse is likely, despite the apparent degree of goodwill
that has developed between the partners. Basic issues such as the distribution of posts to
party militants provoked tensions within the coalition. At times, even the lack of
acknowledgement of a party leader also appeared to potentially unravel the coalition.
Moreover, expanding the coalition to include other members, such as the NFR, carries
with it a serious cost in terms of cabinet posts.
A breakdown in the coalition would have severe consequences for governability in
Bolivia, as the president’s party would have a very difficult time articulating a new
coalition with other members of the opposition. An early transition, which is what many
desire, would submerge the country into a long period of uncertainty. No constitutional
mechanism for succession exists and the president’s resignation alone would not suffice.
Assuming Vice President Carlos Mesa assumed the post, he would be expected to call
early elections rather than serve out the remaining four years left in the presidential
period. If the experience of Ecuador is any indication, transitions are costly experiments
with very uncertain outcomes. In contexts as problematic as Bolivia, an untimely
transition could send the country into years of turbulence, especially if the opposition is
not satisfied with the outcome.
An untimely transition in the current context would not produce a clear-cut outcome. As
noted earlier, the 2003 crisis has eroded the popularity of all political actors. Although
Evo Morales remains at the helm, his approval rating has also declined. Considering the
electoral rules, it is unlikely that any party would emerge as the winner. Several
possibilities exist, although they are too speculative to fully develop. One contemplates
the return of former president Quiroga leading a new movement that would draw its
strength from dissidents from all parties and the reputation of efficiency that he left
behind. A second likely coalition would be one headed by Reyes Villa’s NFR, which has
adopted the constituent assembly call as one of its principal flags. The NFR is unlikely to
achieve the 50% plus one required to win without a congressional round. Despite its
falling popularity, if elections were held now, the MAS would likely be the principal
contender. Like the others, however, it would fail to attain victory and to become
government it would have to negotiate with the others. Finally, given their poor
performance, the MIR and MNR would appear to have no chance of being major
contenders.
At this particular stage, all actors appear poised to contest the municipal elections next
year and have in some measure left behind the cacophony of earlier months calling for an
early transition. While this is very positive, problems will soon begin to arise with this
electoral process. The most serious is an inexperienced national electoral court that has
9

As Malloy and Gamarra argued in Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia 1964-1985, (New Brunswick:
Transaction Books, 1998), that the fundamental driving force for politics in Bolivia is access to jobs.
While the current coalition was probably driven first and foremost by the need to save the system, the
underlying logic is still driven by job factionalism.
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been mired in problems ranging from resignations to sheer incompetence. According to a
former member of the court, it is unlikely that it will be able to prepare for the elections
and whatever round comes first --municipal or a special presidential election. If this were
to be the case, charges of fraud, and incompetence would erode the legitimacy of the
outcome.
During the first six months of 2003, the ruling coalition experienced several severe
setbacks, including the February 12-13 riots. As a result, the possibility of a coalition
breakdown is not remote. At least three reasons could account for a coalition breakdown.
First, the entry into the coalition of new parties such as VIMA strained relations between
the MNR and MIR almost to the breaking point. VIMA is still in the coalition and the
other two parties have simply agreed to a very precarious balance. Second, the coalition
has nowhere to expand except to include the NFR, which still refuses to join the
government. An NFR entry could make the coalition stronger but its entry is unlikely.
The NFR continues to be one of the principal forces calling for the resignation of
President Sánchez de Lozada. Third, the MIR and the MNR are experiencing severe
internal rifts. In both parties, the senior leadership is facing serious challenges from
younger members who are calling for the modernization of their parties and/or who
disagree with the line adopted by the coalition. These challenges could result in serious
divisions within these two parties that would further serve to weaken the ruling coalition.

SCENARIOS FOR CITIZEN AND PUBLIC SECURITY IN BOLIVIA
In the last few years, surveys in Bolivia have identified a growing sense of public
insecurity stemming from a general urban trend of rising criminality and violence. In
response to this trend, the former government headed by General Banzer and Jorge
Quiroga introduced a plan to guarantee citizen security. In some measure inspired by
community policing notions in the U.S., the central idea was that the Bolivian police
would be restructured to be evermore present in neighborhoods and to be identified as
part of the community in an effort to thwart crime and delinquency. The results of the
citizen security program have not been encouraging, as violent crime has dramatically
increased over the course of the last few years.
The Banzer government’s notion of citizen security referred simply to protecting citizens
from crime. In this sense, the concept was improperly applied, as in essence the
reference was to the traditional notion of public security. Citizen security refers to a
much broader notion of expanding and guaranteeing citizenship rights, including civil
liberties. This confusion in the use of these terms has contributed to the sense that
protection from crime may necessarily be a function of the reduction of citizen rights.
Thus, under the Bolivian notio n of citizen security, the agencies involved in protecting
citizens included the military and the police. As happened in the counter-drug area, the
use of the military in law enforcement activities has led to a significant confusion in roles
and missions. In the worst-case scenario, this confusion has led to excesses in dealing
with alleged criminals; abuses are not condemned because the security from crime is
paramount, not the protection of basic civil liberties. As shall be seen, attempts to
promote citizenship have run into basic demands for security from criminals. The
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paradox is that demands for greater involvement of these actors in public security matters
have come from citizens fearing the breakdown of civil order and not from the military or
the police.
This brief introduction allows for a better understanding of the crisis of public and citizen
security that urban Bolivia appears to be facing. In this particular scenario, it is important
to note that the cross-cutting themes of this assessment are clearly visible. The state is
unable to deal effectively with crime as a result of an ineffective law enforcement
structure. In this sense, the police force is plagued by corruption, organized crime, and
an overall incapacity to deal with crime. At the same time, the entire administration of
justice structure has proven to be inadequate to deal with the current explosion of urban
crime. The theme of social exclusion is also clearly evident in this discussion, as both
victims and victimizers appear to be individuals who are products of a system that has
failed to provide opportunities for most of its members. Finally, the mobilized nature of
civil society has also produced a perverse response to the explosion of crime. In the
context of the weakness of state institutions, lynching, torturing, or beating to death a
suspected criminal has gained remarkable legitimacy.
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Table 1

Description
Common Crimes
Change 1990 base
Population
Common Crimes per
100,000

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

32,531

48,922

64,972

54,052

74,041

63,529

138,246

84,331

75,944

56,181

67,052

149,663

0

50.39

99.72

66.16

127.6

95.29

384.97

159.23

133.45

72.7

106.12

360.06

6,157,449

6,292,889

6,420,792

7,065,211

7,313,939

7,413,834

7,588,392

7,803,317

7,958,492

8,089,494

8,196,324

8,274,325

528

777

1012

765

1012

857

1822

1081

954

698

818

1809
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Table 1 (previous page) summarizes the evolution of crimes in Bolivia over the last
decade. Taking 1990 as a base, the crime rate has expanded nearly 360 percent,
especially in 2001. Preliminary data for 2002 suggests similar figures. 10
Violence in Bolivia has also taken on a gender-based characteristic. In 1995, the Law
Against Family and Domestic Violence (LCVFD) was passed to deal with physical,
psychological, and sexual violence against women. This established specialized units
such as the SLIMS (within municipalities), the Family Protection Brigades (within the
Police), and the Children and Adolescent Ombudsman (Defensorías del la Niñez y
Adolescencia). Despite this effort, intra- family violence, especially against women, is
deeply rooted. The following table shows the rate of intra- family violence between 1997
and 2000.

Table 2 Bolivia: Cases of Intra-Family Violence Attended by Health
Units
Geographic area
Bolivia
Urban
Rural

Inter-Family Violence Against Intra-Family Violence Against
Women
Men

Total

1997 1998 1999 2000 1997
1998 1999
2406 2222 3913 2648
1715
1641 2774
1324 660 1011
1082 1562 2902

937
1711

929
786

500
1141

839
1935

2000
1884

1997
691

1998
581

1999
1139

2000
764

753
1131

395
296

160
421

172
967

184
580

Source: Based on data from Bolivia: Anuario Estadístico 2000, page 256.

These cases do not reveal a clear pattern in terms of physical aggression against women.
In 1998, these cases were down in relation to 1997. In 1999, an increase occurred
followed by a decline in the year 2000. The most significant difference is found when
comparing urban and rural violence. Only in 1997 was intra- family violence against
women greater in urban areas. In all other cases, however, intra-family female violence
was much higher in the rural areas.
Numerous factors account for this explosion in criminality. New attempts to provide
resources and incentives for rural agricultural sectors, through land-tenure programs and
new social services, have not helped rural sectors develop competitive economic
alternatives. As a result of the capitalization and privatization of state industries, which
produced high levels of unemployment, combined with the steady influx of migrants
from rural to urban zones, Bolivia experienced accelerated growth of peri- urban,
10

These data are taken from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. A more detailed analysis of this trend
can be found in Defensor del Pueblo, Informe Especial del Defensor del Pueblo Sobre Seguridad
Ciudadana en Bolivia (La Paz, 2002). In our view, while the data reflect a plausible general trend, the dip
in the mid -1990s merits careful re -evaluation and interpretation. One interpretation could be that the
economy was doing better, so crime rates dropped considerably. Another unlikely explanation is that the
Banzer-Quiroga government launched its Citizen Security Plan and that it is responsible for the decrease in
crime. In our view, the problem lies with the law enforcement source of the data. Data gathered by the
team directly from the police in La Paz, El Alto and Santa Cruz was different from the data provided by the
INE and the Defensoría del Pueblo study.
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underdeveloped, peripheral villas miserias (shantytowns). These communities grew up
rapidly in and around major urban areas, such as La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz and
Cochabamba, with little regulation, often as technically illegal land takeovers, or in the
form of migrant “dormitory” communities, and in conflict with the urban planning of
local municipalities. These communities became sites for new sweatshops, clandestine
factories, and other ventures in the “informal” economy. A recent and significant
phenomenon has been the dramatic arrival of other immigrant groups, such as migrants
returning from Argentina, who have arrived to swell the ranks of the urban unemployed
in Cochabamba, and Peruvians who have become an important group in El Alto.
Peripheral communities organized themselves politically, often on the basis of previous
political experience in mining, labor, or peasant unions. These communities petitioned
local, provincial, and departmental municipal governments for the extension of basic
services to these zones, including water, trash pick up, sewer drainage, paved roads,
public bus services, and electricity, as well as for public recognition as “legal”
settlements. Despite the continued funneling of funds to municipalities through popular
participation or regional NGO support with foreign resources, funding remains woefully
inadequate to meet the new pace of accelerated urban growth and to supply basic services
to new communities. Regional elites, often filling out the political and civil hierarchies
of provincial towns and small cities, operate in the new peripheral zones by establishing
political bases built on patronage support (with political favors for votes), engage in graft,
and alienate new urban migrants.
The lack of municipal response to the desperate needs of peripheral communities led to
growing resentment among “inner-city” urban dwellers toward new undesirable social
elements represented by the in- migrating population. A “bribe culture” among public
servants who do work in the urban peripheral context—such as schoolteachers, police
officers, local officials, lawyers, and judges—caused communities to look to their own
means for self-support and communal defense against urban predators like thieves or
gangs. Communities began to make “justice with their own hands,” organizing vigilante
groups, carrying out lynchings, and seeking out other spectacular and unconstitutional
means to advertise their evident profound disempowerment. In the process, the value of
citizenship as a worthwhile social category promising “rights” was greatly diminished,
and popular sectors questioned the incentives to cooperate with government civil society
reforms.
In cities such as Santa Cruz and El Alto, this general situation dramatically manifested a
sudden increase in violence, assaults, kidnappings, robberies and other crimes. Criminal
youth gangs, comprised mainly of the adolescent children of second-generation migrants
from rural areas, proliferated, thus creating a general sense of public insecurity. At the
same time, drug abuse has become a significant problem among these youth. Moreover,
among female adolescents, prostitution has become a viable way to avert the life of
poverty and marginality that they encounter in these peri- urban settings.
In this particular setting, the major proble m has been the inability of law enforcement to
take effective action that might lead to greater public security. In the context of the
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implementation of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which aims to promote basic due
process and to minimize human rights abuses, it has been more difficult to simply arrest
and detain without due process for individuals accused of criminal behavior. Police
complain that sometimes the criminals they detain are released before they can even file
the required paperwork because of the CCP’s generosity toward criminals. In their view
and that of many citizens, the CCP has sided with the criminal and punished the victim.
The public’s perception, as evidenced by press coverage throughout Bolivia, is that the
CCP is largely responsible for the increase in public insecurity that has occurred over the
past two years. A general sense appears to be brewing among the public, law
enforcement, judges, and policymakers that, while it is a “nice document,” the CCP is a
foreign imposition that is not adequate to the social reality of the country. The
proliferation of acts of vigilantism in cities such as Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and El Alto
in recent months suggests that the complaints by law enforcement officials that they are
unable to respond has led the public to accuse them of joining the criminals, and thus has
justified their own direct brand of justice.
In the shanty towns that surround Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, El Alto and La Paz, residents
have resorted to direct action in the midst of what they perceive as the inaction of state
institutions such as the police and the justice system. In other words, the poor take justice
into their own hands. According to sociologist Juan Ramón de la Quintana, at least eight
cases of urban lynchings were documented in 2002. Another significant trend toward the
privatization of justice occurs in the wealthier areas, where private security agencies have
proliferated because the police are no longer able to provide security.
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Figure 8

The Santa Cruz Situation
•

In 2002, the Technical Police registered almost 1,500 cases of aggravated assault, up
from only 106 in 2001. Through the end of December 2002, 200 murders were registered
in Santa Cruz, up from 69 the previous year. The Technical Police also announced a 233
percent increase in robbery, at a daily average rate of 7.8. These figures do not take into
account petty theft, which according to the PTJ reached 9,834 cases.

•

According to the Santa Cruz police, the most serious situation is the proliferation of
youth gangs. In 2002, 65 such gangs, varying in size from 20 to 100 youths, were said to
exist in different neighborhoods of the city. Police claim that these gangs account for the
increase in armed robberies, which occasionally have ended with fatalities. Youth gangs
in Santa Cruz have adopted names such as Los Satánicos, Los Escorpiones, Los Latin
Kings, Los Bagales, and Los Vikingos. Turf battles between these gangs have resulted in
large street brawls that produce large numbers of injured teens.

•

Santa Cruz presents an interesting example of the trend toward the privatization of
security. According to the Federación de Transportistas (Transport Federation), between
1999 and 2000, 316 taxi drivers were victims of crime. In 2002 alone, 80 taxi drivers
suffered some form of assault; 30 drivers were murdered in the course of the attacks. As
a result, with the support of the Civic Committee, taxi drivers organized a protest march
on August 10 demanding protection from the government. Subsequently, they
announced the establishment of an armed self-defense group. On August 8, a selfdescribed Association of Crime Victims announced the establishment of an armed
civilian squadron to fight crime.

•

Car theft has also become a significant dimension of organized crime in Santa Cruz.
According to the police, car theft rings are run directly by convicts from inside the walls
of the Palmasola prison. In 2002, several individuals claimed to have received phone
calls from inside the prison demanding ransom payments in exchange for their stolen
vehicles. According to the Stolen Vehicle Division of the Santa Cruz Police Department
(Dirección Departamental de Prevención e Investigación de Robo de Vehículos), 3359
cars were stolen in 2002.

Apart from the accusatory finger pointed at the CCP, police accuse the Human Rights
Ombudsman’s Office of generating a culture of disrespect for the law. Officers claim
that criminals defy officers and threaten to sick the Defensoría on them for violating their
human rights. A few citizens groups, egged on by press coverage of the release of
individuals accused of crime because evidence was scant or non-existent, have made
significant noise against the CCP and the Defensoría for protecting criminals who prey
on their victims after they are released.
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In the context described above, one of the most significant problems has to do with the
police institution, which is the only one that must daily deal with the problem. According
to a recent Defensoría del Pueblo study, there are at least ten problems that affect the
ability of the police to deal with the proliferation of crime: 1) politicization; 2) the
militarization of its structure; 3) inefficient centralization; 4) extensive corruption; 5)
extensive impunity; 6) discrimination; 7) inequity; 8) instability in its leadership
structure; 9) lack of resources to effectively fight crime; and 10) low levels of
professionalism. These problems were confirmed in the city of El Alto by two focus
groups the CVA team conducted. The general perception that the police are largely to
blame for the proliferation of crime has undermined the legitimacy of the institution.
This situation begs for the establishment of foreign donor programs aimed at police
reform.
The previous description of the situation was written before the February incidents
involving the police. The situation with crime and punishment in Bolivia became more
serious after those incidents in large measure because the police force itself became
engaged in violence. In late February 2003, the police institution became fifty percent
armed union, as Jose Gramunt described it in the aftermath of the riots, and fifty percent
organized crime. Not only had it acted like a labor union seeking higher wages by
shooting at the government palace, an innumerable number of officers were facing
accusations of corruption, armed robbery, theft, and other major crimes. Citizen
confidence in the police was at an all time low before February 12.
The perverse paradox of the February riots was that the death of more than a dozen
members of the police and the riots that followed the battle between the military and the
police, the police emerged as the victim of the military and as the only institution capable
of restoring order in Bolivia. At the same time, public support for the military waned.
Popular support for the police dropped again in subsequent months, especially as the
crime wave ran its course unabated.
In Santa Cruz, a crime wave characterized by murders, carjackings, kidnappings and
other such crimes has held the citizens of that city at bay. Calls for greater police
presence have been answered, and the police still lack the credibility and the training to
make many inroads. At the same time, paramilitary types of citizen defense units, such
as Seguridad Ciudadana Camba (SCC) have announced their appearance and have
pledged to clean up the city by executing criminals. In rural Bolivia, especially the
Altiplano and the Cochabamba region, lynchings or beatings of suspected criminals are
on the rise.
The government has sought assistance from Spain to reform the police and to deal with
the crime wave that is enveloping the country. US assistance to the police is under
review as some units that received training were engaged in the February incidents.
With perhaps one exception, officers involved in the riots have essentially been pardoned.
In summary, the police will receive additional training from Spain, but the structure of
the institution will remain largely the same as before February 12. Given this situation, it
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is unlikely that the current police force will be able to make much of a dent into the crime
wave that is affecting the country.

Scenario 3.1. Deepening of the trend toward violence and criminality in the
context of an accelerated decline in public confidence in the
police and a rejection of the new CCP. (High Probability)
Crime and violent activity across the country’s four largest cities is likely to increase
dramatically in the context of the economic crisis and continued rural migration. Crime
rates are likely to continue at their current high level because no measures have been
taken to effectively address the explosion of criminal activity. The high level of distrust
in the police that prevails, owing mainly to a general perception that they are part of
organized criminal bands, will continue to contribute to the problem. Police at all levels
of the institution will continue to lack proper training on the CCP, and will join those
sectors of society who blame increases in crime on the new code. The problem will be
compounded by the simple fact that the Judicial Technical Police (Policía Técnica
Judicial) will continue to release suspects who are improperly arrested. As an increasing
number of suspects are released for lack of evidence or other reasons, the pressure will
continue to build for a modification of the code, or even a complete rejection of what is
labeled by many as an imported piece of legislation with no applicability to Bolivia.
Scenario 3.2. The trend toward public insecurity will accelerate
dramatically, causing the emergence of organized and
popular vigilante activity. (High Probability)
The first scenario may simply be a prelude to this second trend, which is already reaching
significant levels throughout Bolivia. Citizens will continue to take the law into their
own hands at an alarming rate, claiming that the police have joined the criminals and that
the only way to guarantee security in the streets is to send a direct message to criminals.
Lynching may become a routine way for communities to deal with robbery, assaults, and
other such crimes. Law enforcement, fearing retaliation from the citizenry, will continue
to be incapable of stepping in to protect those accused of crimes. This particular
characteristic is possible in cities such as Santa Cruz, where increases in criminal activity
are blamed not only on the CCP, police complicity, and the Defensoría, but also on the
presence of Kolla migrants from the highlands. This particular form of vigilantism is
already evident in the rural areas of Santa Cruz, where large landholders have organized
such groups to fend off so-called land invaders. It is also evident in the middle of the
principal cities as well, where several petty criminals have met death as a result of
beatings, burnings, or lynchings by angry mobs. While there may be some outcry in the
press about this kind of activity, and the Defensoría would likely play a role in
condemning such acts, the affected sectors may indeed welcome this kind of public
security mechanism.
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Scenario 3.3. The overall deterioration in public security will lead to the
accelerated presence of private security firms, leading to the
overall privatiza tion of security. (High Probability)
The huge increase in crime rates over the past five years or so has resulted in the
increased presence of private security firms. In fact, new legislation was approved
allowing the presence of these institutions. This form of privatized security is
particularly evident in the wealthier neighborhoods of the largest cities, as it appeals to
those who can afford the service. In many cases, individual private guards are former
police or military officers. Moreover, former military or police are often behind these
private security firms. At the same time, a large number of the individuals hired as
guards have no formal security training. In this context, one likely situation is that
private security guards acting to protect their clients could use unnecessary force leading
to death or injury of suspects. This has been a very common trend in other countries
where private security firms have proliferated. Untrained security guards with handguns
or other weaponry also tend to use these weapons inappropriately.
Scenario 3.4. Increases in crime soon overcome the ability of private security
guards and the police. The military takes on a greater role in
internal security to control the expansion of criminal activity.
(Medium Probability)
Bolivia’s police force has already demonstrated that it is incapable of dealing with the
proliferation of urban crime. As criminal youth gangs and other organized crime groups
grow in size and influence, citizens will demand a much stronger hand to restore peace
and tranquility to their neighborhoods. Private security guards provide some relief to the
wealthy who can afford to pay for this service. Vigilante activity, including occasional
lynchings, proves to not be an effective deterrent to crime. More importantly, in cities
such as El Alto and Santa Cruz, citizens complain that crime rates are the result of the
actions of foreigners, especially Argentine, Peruvian, or even Brazilian criminals. In this
context of apparent urban breakdown and lack of response to citizen demands, the
government orders military forces to participate in urban law enforcement activities. The
results would be a temporary relief for the affected neighborhood, but no relief to those
areas to which criminal activity would be displaced.

SCENARIOS IN THE ECONOMIC ARENA
The Bolivian economy has experienced five straight years of recession, and there is no
end in sight. Government economists project a growth rate of about two percent for
2002, which is not eno ugh to resolve the serious problems that the country faces. The
most pressing issue is an open unemployment rate of about 12 percent, and a staggering
68-72 percent of the population that survives in the informal sector. Most Bolivians are
outside the economic mainstream and survive on what informality gives them.
Additionally, Bolivia continues to be one of the most unequal economies in Latin
America in terms of income and wealth distribution. Similarly, poverty rates, which
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appeared to drop in the 1990s, are now on the rebound. 11 Finally, the impact of the crisis
of Bolivia’s incipient industrial sector has been huge. At least one of interviewees
claimed that 40 percent of the manufacturing industry in Bolivia had closed down in the
last four years. If this is the case, Bolivia is undergoing a de- industrialization process
similar only to Argentina.
Economic analysts interviewed for this assessment argue that the basic problem with
Bolivia’s economy is a dramatic drop in aggregate demand. In other words, no one
appears to be buying or selling anything. In the first few months of the Sánchez de
Lozada government, attempts were made to stir demand, but to no avail. The
government’s Plan Bolivia aimed to fuse the MNR’s and MIR’s electoral platforms by
linking work and emergency themes in an attempt to deal with the crisis. The three
pillars of the strategy include: a so-called enterprise hospital; public works with jobs; and
social protection. Overall, the most notable dimension of this plan is the role of the state,
which has taken on a protagonist presence to resolve the crisis. Plan Bolivia aims to
assist firms that are in crisis through debt relief programs, and launch a massive road and
housing construction program that will, according to government officials, generate over
200,000 jobs and result in an investment of over five billion dollars. The government
also extended emergency employment programs (PLANE) through the end of 2003. In
addition, the government received a $40 million pledge from the IDB to facilitate plans to
address these pressing social needs.
As noted earlier, the government’s principal economic strategy during its first months in
office was to send to Congress the BONOSOL, which established a payment of $bs1,800
(about $250 USD) per year to all Bolivians over the age of 65. This bill created a serious
political scuffle, as members of the opposition, presumably on the left, opposed what is in
essence an entitlement to one of the most excluded social sectors. At issue was the
source of the money, which the opposition claimed would deplete worker contributions to
the so-called Fondo de Capitalización Individual (FCI), a fund where workers contribute
voluntarily to their retirement pensions. At the same time, the government pushed a
universal insurance scheme for mothers and children under five (Seguro Universal
Materno Infantil-SUMI). In essence, the program transfers resources and responsibilities
to the 316 municipal governments. Critics are wary of the ability of municipal
governments to carry out these tasks. As was the case with the BONOSOL, the SUMI
had few supporters in the opposition, which paradoxically appeared to be calling for
greater fiscal responsibility despite their populist and leftist leanings.
The principal short-term issue faced by the government is the launching of an economic
recovery plan. To be successful, this plan would have to deal with three simultaneous
issues. First, the plan would have to count on the blessing of the IMF. Negotiations
between the government and the IMF mission to Bolivia have been ongoing for at least
11

An important discussion regarding poverty rates in Bolivia has taken place over the past few years. The
most important data on trends can be found from INE and UDAPE. According to the data, poverty rates
dropped considerably in the 1990s. The economic crisis that has afflicted Bolivia, and the continued
expansion of the informal sector, has contributed in our view to the rebound of poverty in the early 2000s.
Government officials interviewed for this project share this interpretation.
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four months, and they have not been pleasant. At times, rumors circulated that the
negotiations were about to end, that the cabinet was deeply divided over the IMF
recommendations, and that the mission would soon leave Bolivia. Satisfying the IMF
involves dealing with the fiscal deficit that exceeded eight percent of GDP, although this
includes the deficit acquired as a result of pension reform. In any case, the government
had to come up with a way to limit spending or raise revenue to pay for its social
programs. Either way, the choices were limited and difficult.
On February 9, 2003, President Sánchez de Lozada launched a major tax reform plan
aimed at both generating revenue to carry out the government’s “Obras con empleos”
program and satisfying the IMF’s condition to reduce the size of the fiscal deficit.
According to President Sánchez de Lozada, the basic criteria of the new plan was not to
harm the poorest Bolivians and to ask middle class Bolivians to assume this sacrifice.
Sánchez de Lozada also claimed that unless this plan was approved (it was part of the
budget that must be discussed in Congress), the country was headed toward economic
collapse. A few government officials claimed that the plan, which involved a 12.5
percent tax increase, was the most significant economic program since the launching of
the NPE in 1985. The opposition including the MAS, the COB and even the private
sector called for mobilization to resist this plan.
The economic plan did not include anything tangible beyond the BONOSOL and SUMI,
which had earned the government the support of at least 300,000 Bolivians, including
senior citizens and mothers. New taxes rarely generate any supporters, and the costs of
the program appeared to be unevenly distributed. Most predicted street marches and
other demonstrations throughout 2003.
The new economic plan included a small dose of symbolism that attempted to signal that
the country was moving “beyond neoliberalism” toward a more humane development
strategy. How this was to be accomplished in the context of raising taxes to satisfy the
IMF was the key question. Just as there was a need in 1985 to redefine the development
strategy, this government faced the challenge of inventing a new one that can generate
some type of national consensus. The only innovation is renewed state involvement in
the economy, and the February 9 plan did not go far enough in this direction. To the
contrary, it appeared to reaffirm Neoliberalism.
The riots of February 12-13, spearheaded by the assault on the presidential palace by the
police, were in direct response to Sánchez de Lozada’s economic plan. This popular
perception was so intense that by 4:30 pm of February 12, the president withdrew the
proposal hoping that things would calm down. Hours later they did but not before
hundreds were injured and several dozen were killed. The government was forced to go
back to the beginning, only now it lacked any political basis to pursue a strategy.
Pursuing a new development strategy, even in a symbolic way, will have to take into
account the tremendous anti-capitalization sentiment that has emerged in Bolivia in the
wake of scandals related to the sale of LAB, the national airline, to VASP, a bankrupt
Brazilian airline. The apparent rescue of the airline by Bolivian entrepreneurs failed to
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save the airline. Instead it brought to the fore charges of corruption and back-door deals.
Even in those industries that have improved service, such as ENTEL, the national
telecommunications company, Bolivians have complained of outrageous fees and
charged the company with hiding profits.
The anti-capitalization sentiment is particularly sensitive as a result of the impending
decision to sell natural gas to the U.S. through Chile. As the leader of the party that
launched capitalization, few expect the president to abandon this strategy. At the same
time, attempts at deepening capitalization strategies will inevitably stir social unrest. In
the aftermath of the February riots, the government indefinitely postponed the gas
decision and most analysts believe that the business opportunity to sell to California has
been lost.
On a related front is the whole issue of anti-globalization, especially the recent protests
against the FTAA/ALCA staged by Evo Morales and the MAS. Social mobilization
against free trade has taken on an important dimension in Bolivia, although it is still
incipient. Nevertheless, billboards, seminars, workshops, and demonstrations against
ALCA have become commonplace in recent months. In early December, even James
Petras, the controversial anti- globalization professor from SUNY Binghamton, delivered
standing-room-only lectures to MAS supporters. In the first six months of 2003, Evo
Morales has significantly expanded the anti-FTAA/ALCA rhetoric and has consolidated
international support for his position.
While Bolivia has been involved in the FTAA negotiations since they were launched in
1998, the Banzer/Quiroga and Sánchez de Lozada governments have done very little to
develop an understanding of the proposed trade arrangements. Under Quiroga, almost
the entire focus was on the U.S. congressional ratification of a new Andean Trade
Preference Act with more stringent anti- narcotics provisions. Bolivia under Sánchez de
Lozada appears to be waiting mainly for some direction from Brazil’s Lula. After
visiting Brazil during the Lula inauguration, the Bolivian president noted that there was a
need to think about the FTAA and to seriously consider a bilateral agreement with the
U.S.
In any case, no real FTAA strategy is likely to emerge, especially after the February riots.
At the same time, the anti-FTAA movement appears to be growing beyond the
predictable opposition of the MAS and its supporters. The focus group conducted by the
CVA team in Santa Cruz, for example, revealed an extraordinary level of anti-FTAA
sentiment among the business community in that city, where most of the county’s export
industry resides. Business people attacked U.S. subsidies, complained of closed borders,
and noted that free trade would constitute unfair trade because smaller economies such as
Bolivia could not possibly compete with the U.S. In short, their complaints echoed those
of the MAS and the traditional anti- imperialist left.
Although free trade appears to be a major catalyst of nationalistic sentiment, it is unlikely
to be the great articulator of conflict in Bolivia. Anti-FTAA sentiment will prevail and
will likely serve Evo Morales and other individuals such as Oscar Olivera, who will
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continue to thrive from multiple invitations around the world to anti- globalization
forums. These movements, however, are unlikely on their own to be the cause of major
conflict in Bolivia.
If the natural gas issue is placed within the context of the anti-globalization movement,
then the situation might change considerably. As many of the dozens of interviewees for
this assessment noted, the great articulator of social conflict in Bolivia could be the
decision to sell gas to the U.S. through Chile. This decision, which is unlikely to be
announced in the aftermath of the February 2003 riots, has the potential of linking the
anti- free trade movement with anti-Chilean nationalism and with the anti-privatization
(capitalization) sentiment that has swept the country in recent years.
Scenario 4.1. The Stand by agreement with the IMF provides sufficient new
capital to allow the government to survive through 2003.
Growth rates are not met, widespread protests occur
nationwide. By late 2003, the government will again have to
negotiate an IMF agreement and will face an even greater
crisis than the one it faced in February. (High Probability)
The Stand By agreement with the IMF was signed in the wake of the February riots and
seeks only to give the government enough support to enable it to survive this year. The
most important characteristic of this agreement is that it opens the door for additional
funding from agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter American Development
Bank. The Stand By agreement presupposes that Bolivia will be able to: increase its
hydrocarbons production, double textile exports as a result of the ATPA mechanism that
allows these to enter the US duty free; and, expand agricultural production because of
improved irrigation and transportation systems. 12
The Stand By may have bought the government much needed time and may allow it to
survive 2003, but it has certainly not resolved Bolivia’s serious economic crisis.
Hydrocarbons exports over the long term are jeopardized without the sale of natural gas
and there is no likely deal in the horizon. Moreover, investment even in the hydrocarbons
sector is likely to disappear in the current context of uncertainty. It is also unlikely that
the government will pursue a strategy to sell gas through Chile. The most promising
sector appears to be the textile sector, but it is still too small to make a major dent on
Bolivia’s economy and is certainly not going to be the motor behind the economy’s
recovery. Agricultural growth is also another illusive target, especially if unrest plagues
the countryside.
By the end of 2003, the government will have to again come to terms with the economic
reality of the country and put forth a plan that deals with cash shortfalls and a budget
deficit as high as 10 percent of GDP. This is a worst-case scenario, especially if the
government coalition fails to provide the political muscle. In any event, social
mobilization against any plan is likely to occur. This economic reality is one that will
12

See Muller and Associados, El Acuerdo con el Fondo Monetario Internacional y la Coyuntura, Mayo
2003.
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affect this government severely, but would be more severe if opposition sectors obtain
their goal of an early transition. The possibility that a transition government will fare
better is remote or nil because the economic situation would be even worse than under
present circumstances.
Scenario 4.2. To avert a repetition of the February events, the government
produces an economic package that relies heavily on public
spending and foreign assistance. The plan is able to produce a
very visible response that receives popular support and allows
the government to not only survive 2003 but to also look with
greater optimism to finishing its term. (Medium Probability)
The government will attempt to produce an economic package that is heavily oriented
toward public relief measures that will reduce unemployment, target poverty, and
otherwise produce tangible short term and visible results. This economic package is the
government’s last best hope that it will restore faith in its ability to govern Bolivia. The
government economic team centered in UDAPE and the office of the Ministry of the
Presidency has the talent and the president’s support to produce such a plan.
This is a long shot scenario, as the Bolivian economy has shown few signs of recovery,
the international donor community has seen no real progress toward such a plan, and the
government’s economic team has no real visible political support. For this reason, it is
unlikely that a government-rescuing economic plan will be produced before it again has
to face widespread social mobilization and a new round of negotiations with the IMF.
Scenario 4.3. Sale of natural gas fuels nationalism and nationwide protests
(Low Probability)
Following the February crisis, this scenario is unlikely to occur for the foreseeable future.
Here, the government announces the sale of natural gas to the U.S. The sale involves
putting together an international consortium of investors made up of companies from
Argentina, Britain, the U.S., and Spain. Responding mainly to the economic logic that
the sale would be more profitable through Chilean territory, the government takes the
calculated risk to announce a deal that involves the construction of a pipeline to a coastal
town in Chile, the construction of a gas-to-liquid plant in Chile, and the purchase of
several tankers. The government justifies the sale by stating that the profits from the
investment deal would result in the quadrupling of Bolivia’s income from exports. To
mitigate the possibility of a social explosion, the government announces that it would
also construct a system that would deliver natural gas to the homes of most Bolivians at a
subsidized price.
Despite unsuccessful or unpopular privatization measures in the past (e.g., Water Wars
involving the sale of SEMAPA in Cochabamba), Bolivia agrees to the natural gas deal
and fights the generalized perception that the negotiations with private investors were
characterized by a weak negotiating position. Opposition groups, including the MAS,
MIP, civic committees, and others, argue that the government has increased the
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vulnerability of a domestic economy that continues to lack both diversification and
favorable trade status. They also argue that different transnational corporations, largely
unfamiliar with the questions of social capital “on the ground,” will become major
economic (and also political) actors in Bolivia overnight. Moreover, they contend that
operations are conducted in a nontransparent fashion, fostering a public perception of
collusion between foreign investment interests and Bolivian national elites in
government.
The government is moving cautiously so as not to stir the wrath of the myriad groups that
expressed their opposition to building a pipeline to Chile and exporting Bolivian gas
through Chilean ports. While it would appear that the anti- gas-sale coalition would span
ideological, generational, and regional lines, civic groups in Tarija and Santa Cruz, the
departments where most of the natural gas and hydrocarbon reserves are located, support
the government’s decision and mobilize to defend it. The potential confrontation
between nationalists and regional economic interests is indeed high in this scenario.

SCENARIOS FOR LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE
The February 2003 riots have not fundamentally altered the scenarios developed by the
original CVA team. At best, the situation remains the same. In fact, the riots and the
uncertainty that resulted from them, has exacerbated the situation as moves toward
dealing with the land issue have met with severe political resistance within the ruling
coalition to the point that high ranking government officials believed that dealing with
this issue could trigger the collapse of the gove rnment.
Land ownership and use in Bolivia is the one area where consensus exists that conflict is
most likely to occur. Asked by the CVA team what would trigger conflict in Bolivia in
the next five years, Evo Morales, the leader of the opposition and coca growers, answered
“the land question.” When this assessment was originally commissioned, it was widely
assumed that the focus would not be on land but on other more pressing issues. As the
team conducted interviews in the field, however, it became cle ar not only that land was
one of the main potential sources of conflict but that it touched upon so many of the other
areas where conflict was detected. This section draws heavily from the USAIDcommissioned study by Rafael Diez and several other documents. Rather than duplicate
the findings of these studies, however, this section provides an historical overview of the
land issue in Bolivia and develops a set of conflict scenarios.
In 1953, on the heels of the 1952 revolution that brought the MNR party to power for the
first time, Bolivia undertook a comprehensive agrarian reform process. While this reform
and the creation of a Ministry of Peasant Affairs had an important impact on the
redistribution of land, wealth, and social equity, the reform remained incomplete.
Between 1954 and 1968, out of a total of 36 million hectares of land under cultivation,
only 8 million hectares changed ownership. Similarly, from 1962 to 1983, only 17.4
percent of the available land was distributed. The reform was also unevenly applied, with
more land distributed in the Altiplano and Cochabamba valley areas through peasant
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agrarian unions. In most cases, lowland landowners in Santa Cruz found ways to hold
onto their large holdings while lowland Indians were largely ignored.
The original 1953 reform protected both small and medium plots and large-scale
agribusinesses from expropriation. In theory, the goals were to both protect individual
family cultivators and to promote modern mechanized farming, with an eye toward
developing an export economy. In practice, the results were quite different. Large
landowners, particularly in the departments of Tarija, Santa Cruz, and Chuquisaca,
resisted the reform and were often able to maintain control of their holdings through
redefinitions of their land as medium- sized, or by defining land for livestock rather than
agriculture. Thus, large landholders avoided being categorized as latifundistas. In other
regions, such as rural Chuquisaca, the pre-1953 landed elite was particularly successful in
carrying out a counter reform by infiltrating the regional MNR party structure, and
creating or co-opting local agrarian union leaders as loyal clients, often through illegal
gifts of land.
Utilizing an idealized and unrealistic notion of indigenous or peasant “corporate” or
“communal” land holdings, the reform also did not take into account of the diversity of
land use practices, including communal holdings among highland ethnic federations, or
“ayllus,” lowland indigenous groups or potential agribusiness. Land speculators, often
also peasant union leaders, used the precedent of “corporate” land grants as reserves for
groups of previously landless families, who then farmed their parcels as individual plots.
In areas where large amounts of land were distributed to peasants, the distribution of
individual family plots (minifundios) and the appearance of so-called “new towns” in the
countryside accelerated. These also became sites for new agricultural markets.
Excessive fragmentation of land through minifundios and divisible inheritance led to the
multiplication of land holdings that were not agriculturally or economically viable. This
soon forced many families to diversify their domestic economies, to increase their ties to
nearby cities, or to leave the countryside altogether.
With the overthrow of the MNR in 1964, the role of land in national politics quickly
changed from a concern with social revolution and reform to a key strategy of social
control by the military-based authoritarian governments headed by General René
Barrientos (1964-1969) and General Hugo Banzer Suárez (1971-1978). This strategy
became institutionalized under a so-called Military-Peasant Pact initiated in the early
1960s. By 1974, the agrarian union momentum in Cochabamba, Achacachi, and
elsewhere had lost the autonomy it enjoyed during the revolutionary era, and was instead
converted into an instrument of control by successive military leaders. In this new
relationship, particularly under Barrientos, land, tractors, and money were distributed to
loyal campesino “clients.” These, in turn, became the local power base for sustaining the
dictatorships. This strategy was continued under Banzer’s regime, even as Banzer also
redirected political attention and economic resources from the highland regions to the
agro- industrial, commercial, and financial interests of Santa Cruz. The Pacto Militar
Campesino came to a dramatic end in the mid 1970s, however, as a result of a violent
confrontation in the town of Tolata between peasant protesters and government troops.
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The military period (1964-1981) that followed the MNR was also significant in terms of
the pattern of land distribution in Bolivia. If the 1952 revolution and the agrarian reform
decree of 1953 established the basis for a significant process of land distribution, the
military governments that ruled Bolivia between 1964 and 1982 were responsible for an
equally important process of reverting land tenure and creating a new and perhaps more
predatory landholding class. According to some accounts, the Banzer government alone
was responsible for handing out millions of hectares to supporters, especially in the
departments of Santa Cruz and the Beni. The corrupt practice of handing out large
parcels of land in exchange for support is at the core of contemporary land-based conflict.
A watershed moment in the breakdown of this vertical relation of patronage and
clientelism through land distribution was the national emergence of the Katarista
movement and the creation of the Confederación Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos
(CSUTCB) in 1978. Katarismo (which took its name from the rebel leader of the 1740s,
Tupac Katari) both shifted the axis of control of peasant politics from Cochabamba to the
Altiplano, and reestablished a degree of autonomy within the highland peasant
movement. Another watershed moment was the 1990 Marcha por la Dignidad y la
Vida, organized by the emergent Central Indígena de Pueblos Originarios (CIDOB),
which drew attention to land inequities, particularly the legally unrecognized communal
holdings for lowland indigenous people, and began the process of creating common cause
between highland and lowland indigenous peoples.
In 1992, the insistent call for a comprehensive reform motivated the government of Jaime
Paz Zamora to undertake a revaluation of the moribund National Council for Agrarian
Reform. The subsequent review culminated in 1996 with the creation of an Instituto
Nacional de Reforma Agraria and a new agrarian reform: law number 1715 (called the
Ley INRA). The INRA law attempts to correct the flaws in the original 1953 reform by
shifting the emphasis away from family plots and to communal holdings. It also
emphasizes the preexistent claims of originarios (highland Indians) and indígenas
(lowland Indians), in contrast to the previous emphasis of working through “peasant”
agrarian unions. Like the earlier reform, however, INRA also places primary emphasis
on the titling and distribution of land.
As such, INRA specifies the following categories of titling:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

An individual family landholding where the family lives on the land,
considered non-divisible and not available as collateral (Solar Campesino);
A small landholding considered the primary source of family income for the
landowner and fa mily, also non-divisible and not available as collateral
(Pequeña Propiedad);
Middle-range landholding not for subsistence but for commercial
exploitation, which can be sold, used as collateral, and considered a
financial asset (Mediana Propiedad);
An agricultural enterprise using salaried workers, with independent
investors and employing industrial techniques (Empresa Agropecuaria);
Collectively owned and managed communal territories corresponding to the
traditional “habitats” occupied by indigenous groups, inalienable,
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6.

indivisible and which cannot revert back to the state (Tierras Comunitarias
de Origen - TCO);
Collectively owned communal peasant landholdings.

A notable omission in the construction of potential land “ownership” is that INRA leaves
to one side the problem of whether women can be landowners.
In terms of potential land definition, land distribution, and execution of the INRA law,
the following three avenues for processing land claims are available:
1.
2.
3.

A claim made directly by an individual in areas not protected by existing
state claims;
A claim made to define limits of existing land holdings owned by
individuals;
A communal land grant made to resolve potential conflicts of ownership
between third parties and indigenous communities, where INRA is required
to grant land to indigenous communities in a different but similar location.

The spirit of the INRA law was in keeping with a larger set of reform legislation
implemented in Bolivia and aimed at governmental decentralization, in particular the
1995 Popular Participation Law (PPL). The PPL was designed to recognize pre-existing
and indigenous forms of local or traditional leadership and social or political
organization. These included ayllu, communities, neighborhood committees, unions, and
lowland indigenous groups, now classified as Organizaciones Territoriales de Base
(Territorial Base Communities-OTB).
From 1997-2001, the process of titling land claims included 8,241 cases across all these
categories, and involved 5,562,454 hectares under the procedures detailed above. The
titling and processing of land claims engaged and created distinct sets of regional actors,
leading to different, and often problematic, regional effects. For example, in the lowland
areas corresponding to the zones of Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando, more than 2,500
million hectares were distributed, primarily in the form of TCOs and to cattle and agroindustrial interests, making up more than half of the lands granted in 2001. Particularly
favored in these areas were the “pueblos originarios” and “indígenas,” who were granted
lands in the form of TCOs. In part, the popularity of TCOs reflects the mandates of
foreign aid donors, whose money has been consistently required to drive the INRA
reform process.
A lack of clarification of the relation between INRA and other legislation, such as the
LPP, has introduced several potentially exploitable ambiguities in the application of the
INRA law. One source of ambiguity are the potential contradictions between the crosscutting claims of OTBs and new TCOs, each emphasizing local claims that are differently
articulated around “political” and “agricultural” units, but in practice are often
overlapping (e.g. ayllu “ethnic federations” which are also geographic units). In some
cases, the new definition of TCOs conflicts with existing political units of municipalities
and communities, leading to violent border disputes between ethnic political units, such
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as the battles between the ayllus of Qaqachaqa and Jucumani in 1999, which led to
several deaths.
Achieving gender equality in land tenure is a key area where the goals of the LPP and
INRA are at odds. Article 3 of the INRA law calls for gender equality in land tenure and
equity in the distribution of land regardless of a woman’s civil status. Nevertheless, in
Bolivian custom and practice, inheritance rights have determined access to land in rural
Bolivia. The principal obstacles to the achievement of gender equality in the Altiplano
region have to do with customs, traditions, illiteracy, and the lack of legal knowledge. In
the Valley regions, socio-cultural issues (such as illiteracy and lack of knowledge of
procedures), not legal problems, are more important in determining land tenure. In the
lowlands, the principal problem has to do with the lack of economic resources to
complete the legal process. Women also lack identification documents, something that
has made attaining land titles even more difficult. Because custom and tradition have
become core elements for recognizing indigenous customary law under the LPP, gender
equality has been difficult to promote in the distribution of land.
Another potential point of conflict is the ethnic subtext built into the INRA law, with the
priority given to distinguishing between “originarios” and “indígenas”. This has had a
number of problematic outcomes, particularly the formation of new ethnically slanted
groups pressing for land rights. The most important and controversial of these is the
Movimiento Sin Tierra (MST) of the Chaco and Santa Cruz regions. 13 With the third
Marcha Indígena Campesina y de Colonizadores in 2000, this movement was given fast
track status, and has received land grants in the Chaco region from the current Sánchez de
Lozada government. These grants were not subjected to the process stipulated by the
INRA law. The use of a presidential “Supreme Decree” to modify INRA when
convenient, as with Supreme Decree 25532 signed by then president Banzer, also
undermined INRA’s legal force and inhibited a standardized application of the law. The
contentiousness of this process is illustrated by the discrepancies in the statistics used to
press the case. While the MST estimates their land needs to be approximately 12.5
million hectares for 500,000 people, the GOB, through its Plan Tierra, claims that only up
to 900,000 hectares can be granted. These are crucial differences, and they demonstrate
the politicization of the use of numbers in what has become a media war over land.
This, and the growing presence of highland migrants to eastern lowland Bolivia, has
inflamed the long-term highland/lowland discord articulated around a regional-ethnic
discourse on the differences between Colla (indigenous highlander) and Camba
(lowlander). This off-and-on conflict has also come to be articulated around indigenous
collective land and minifundio claims on the one hand and large-scale cattle or agrofarming on the other. The Cámara Agropecuaria del Oriente (CAO) in Santa Cruz has
championed the cause of agro-business by questioning the priority status given to
different indigenous groups. The CAO has argued that one effect of INRA has been to
weaken the legal status of lands owned or managed by agro-business, thereby potentially
13

In interviews with government officials, the charge was made that the MST has developed significant ties
with the Brazilian MST. During the field research phase, however, these linkages could not be
substantiated.
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damaging the national export economy. In recent years, several publicized cases of
violence against new “colonialists” (typically highlanders who have migrated to the
lowlands) occurred, such as the recent murders of colonos in Panantí and Yapacaní,
apparently by hired guns. Less discussed are reports of violence between neighboring
new settlements of colonos, who sometimes encroach on each other’s newly established
and legally undefined territories.
In the context of the controversy and potential for conflict in settling land disputes, the
government has increasing allowed the strategy of saneamiento interno. 14 In this case,
individual peasant landowners have come together to form apparent “communities,”
when in fact they function as individual farmers. Similarly, diverse migrant colonists—
particularly in the Santa Cruz region—band together and engage in land invasions, often
on land previously owned, land for grazing, or forested land unfit for agriculture. There,
they quickly establish new “indigenous communities,” called saneamientos humanos.
Despite the fact that INRA stresses only preexisting claims, these different groups press
their application for TCO status. An important dimension of the question of land
invasions is the way human land use dovetails or is at odds with biodiversity. CAO and
other organizations have insisted that the best use should be made of Bolivia’s land
resources, and this might not be agricultural in many cases.
Another problematic dimension of the current INRA law are the regionally conflicting
expectations of land tenancy and use. Since 1953, the practice of land reform has been
geared to the granting of individual land parcels to be used by specific families. It has
also been geared primarily to the title as an end point in the land- granting process.
Currently, approximately 87 percent of land owned in Bolivia corresponds to the first and
second categories of titling (see above). These assumptions, however, have clashed with
deeply held beliefs and practices relating to land in the Altiplano region. Specifically, the
CSUTCB, led by Felipe Quispe, has insisted that INRA undermines the collective basis
of Aymara indigenous communities, and is tantamount to the potential co-optation of
indigenous autonomy by the government, as well as an indirect means to tax these
communities. This is a lingering perception that remains from the common practice
under the Military Peasant Pact of the co-optation of peasant union leaders through the
distribution of land.
The CSUTCB also claims that INRA misconstrues the social and cultural nature of land
use in considering the fundamental needs of these communities. It has insisted that
INRA does not adequately take into account the social contexts of the traditional equation
between Quechua and Aymara people and land. For highland indigenous communities,
this includes traditional relations between “people” and “land” (articulated around ideas
of usos y costumbres), and a broader conception of communal land ownership, or
“patrimony,” including soil, subsoil, and air resources. This insistence follows a growing
14

Rafael Diez describes saneamiento interno as “leaving it up to the members of a collective property to
internally resolve property disputes and to then ask INRA for support to carry out the technical work
associated with titling” (Our translation). See La Situación Actual de la Propiedad Agraria en Bolivia, p.4.
The government has favored this process because it believes that property disputes are settled before INRA
is approached.

53

pattern of conflicts over land and land-related issues, clearly initiated by Cochabamba’s
Water War in April of 2000, and the linkage drawn by the Federación Departamental
Cochabambina de Regantes (FEDECOR) between land use and local control over
irrigation needs.
Both Quispe’s MIP and Morales’ MAS have linked the question of land use to other
issues, such as mining, coca, petroleum, gas, and forestry interests, claiming that these
too should fall under the purview of land granting practices. They have also insisted that
land granting alone is insufficient to address long-term colonial-derived questions of
social inequalities, and have pushed for a closer linkage between land granting practices
and broader questions of “development.” This includes access to markets, credit,
technical assistance, and mechanization, as well as the construction of roads, irrigation,
and electrical systems. The unfulfilled promise of tractors to the Altiplano has been an
ongoing, festering issue. For these reasons, INRA grants have been suspended in the
northern Altiplano region, and the CSUTCB continues to push for its own Ley INDIO,
which would supercede INRA and bring about the recomposition of traditional ayllus in
the region. These claims have been linked to an insistence that titling be made a part of a
broader process of transforming these regions into more productive and autonomous
regional agricultural economies.
Across the social spectrum, complaints about both the slow pace and bureaucratic,
technical nature of the new reform process abound. As a result, since 1996 relatively
little land has actually been distributed through INRA. To a significant degree, this
reflects the almost complete reliance on foreign donors to drive the process of reform,
since INRA has an inadequate budget. An important dimension of this problem is the
absence of the state and the reform apparatus in rural areas, particularly the Catastro and
Registro Civil. Complaints are often heard about the expense of getting individual lands
titled, and the need to take a costly trip to the nearest city to get it done. The perception
that INRA has favored wealthy lowland landowners and agro- farmers over peasant and
indigenous claims, together with its relative invisibility in rural areas, has greatly
undermined the legitimacy of the state as a land granting body. This is aggravated by the
almost complete divorce between the state’s technical land granting apparatus through
INRA and local political units or municipalities, whic h remain uninvolved in managing
the reform process. At the same time, the preference among donors that fund the INRA
process has consistently privileged the formation of TCOs over other options available
through INRA, which has created friction among cattle farmers and other agro
industrialists in Santa Cruz and Beni. They believe that TCOs potentially undermine the
legal status of their own land claims.
In the most general sense, these sorts of difficulties point to the urgent need for a further
sharpening of the definition and application of INRA while recognizing the important
regional variations of land tenancy and use. The various potential problems in the
application of INRA sketched out here point to the need for both a regional and subregional application of the law. First and foremost is the question of exactly who
qualifies as a legitimate landowner under INRA, and how collective identity is defined in
this new legal context. The Vice-Ministry of Sustainable Development—currently
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engaged in trying to make INRA more efficient —has in fact emphasized the vital need to
“normatize” INRA to improve the process and speed of its application. To address this
issue, a clearer sorting out of the ambiguities between TCOs, OTBs, and pre-existing
traditional community “customary law” must occur. It must also sort out the potential
multiple contradictions between INRA and existing legislation about natural resources
(e.g., forests, preserves, cattle, hydrocarbons, gas, etc.).
Scenario 5.1. The accumulation of conflicts around the question of land
(High Probability)
In Bolivia, land has become a catalytic issue around which a nominally unified
indigenous and popular movement could take shape. There are several potential
windows of opportunity for such a development. These include most obviously the
seasonal agricultural and festival cycles in the countryside, which conclude in late
February and early March with the end of the celebration of Carnival and the conclusion
of the harvest. Only afterward can political and union leaders mobilize enough willing
participants to stage large-scale social protest movements in the countryside. Another
potentially key window would be the upcoming municipal elections in 2004, which could
prove a crucial watershed for oppositional movements, particularly the MAS, to gain
more adherents. Currently, MAS is courting other movements, such as the MST, and
could enter into such regions as Santa Cruz where it borders the Chapare. Another
potential window might be the looming decision on Bolivia’s newly discovered gas
reserves, due in 2003, where “gas” is considered by both the MIP and the MAS as an
extension of subsoil resources of what they consider to be national patrimony. In this
way, gas can be subsumed in a larger conflict over land, or vice-versa.
Specifically, this scenario assumes that the current government will fail to adequately
address the petitions of MAS in the Chapare and elsewhere regarding greater fiscal
control through the “mancomunidades,” political autonomy, and possibilities for
developing an economic infrastructure in the region. Eventually, the on-again-off-again
dialogue is permanently broken off. This political failure could potentially be
exacerbated by a similar lack of success in dealing with the MIP in the Altiplano. In this
case, the INRA law is never successfully instituted in the region, as the government balks
at calls by the MIP and Felipe Quispe to revise INRA or take into account the suggestions
of their proposed Ley INDIO. This means that the Altiplano does not receive an
adequate investment in further community development, including the promised tractors.
At the same time, the discourse of the “recomposition of ayllus” becomes a sticking point
that similarly leads to the end of productive exchanges between government
representatives and the MIP. These twin failures serve to bring the MAS and the MIP
together into a strategic alliance in strong opposition to the continued implementation of
INRA and around shared concerns about threats to the autonomy of the indigenous
movement in Bolivia.
These events in the highland areas are, in turn, complemented by a breakdown of
governability in the lowlands. This is caused by the increase in “Colla” migrant flows to
the eastern lowlands, to a spiraling pattern of unchecked land invasions by people

55

nominally part of the MST, and by increasingly violent clashes between new colonialists
and agribusiness in Santa Cruz, which cause deaths. Finally, these trends create
momentum for a new national march to the capital by lowland indígenas recently
incorporated into the MAS movement, which involves frequent clashes with police forces
along the way. Meanwhile, such a march is supported by countrywide road blockades in
the Altiplano and Chapare regions, perhaps with a show of support by FEDECOR and
other valley “peasant” organizations. Unable to control such a full-scale mobilization,
the government declares marshal law.
Scenario 5.2. Relative maintenance of governmental control over the land
issue (Medium Probability)
In this scenario, the government successfully matches the strategy of the accumulation of
conflicts through land by productively maintaining separate dialogues with each region
and social sector involved in the INRA orbit. For the Chapare region and the MAS, this
would mean: ceding significant fiscal autonomy at the municipal level; a program to
promote the “mancomunidades”; further promises to produce a comprehensive study on
the legal market for coca production; investment in the economic viability of the Chapare
region; and the continuation and deepening of efforts to identify external markets for the
products produced in the Chapare and in the country. In this scenario, the dialogue
between MAS and the government is never broken off, and is maintained at a slow boil
until at least 2007 and the next presidential election.
In the Altiplano area, the government experiences relative success in co-opting Felipe
Quispe through such actions as the delivery of the tractors requested, and by working
closely with the CSUTCB and MIP to modify INRA in keeping with regional
expectations. This would entail greater involvement in the INRA process by local unions
and municipalities, tacit acceptance of the “parallel nation” argument, and a significant
economic investment—with the help of foreign donors—in shoring up cooperative
agricultural micro-enterprises in the region. 15 This successfully forestalls touching off
another round of roadblocks by the CSUTCB, while decreasing the likelihood that the
MIP and MAS ever find significant common ground.
Meanwhile, in the eastern lowlands, the government successfully continues the precedent
established under the Banzer and Sánchez de Lozada governments of granting land
concessions to legitimate partic ipants in the MST, while taking account of potential
conflicts with agribusiness in and around Santa Cruz. New land grants do not interfere or
overlap with large-scale farming, cattle, forestry, and other, industries in the region. At
the same time, the government makes a concerted attempt to reach out to the business
community of Santa Cruz, engaging in a constructive exchange to develop incentives for
15

Since at least the early 1990s, the notion that Bolivia houses two parallel nations—one indigenous and
another mestizo and white—has been utilized by intellectuals who have significant influence in parties like
the MAS and the MIP. See for example, the works of Alvaro García Linera, Raquel Gutiérrez, Raúl Prada,
and Luis Tapia, Democratizaciones Plebeyas, (La Paz: Muela del Diablo Editores, 2002). Accepting the
parallel nation logic would involve essentially splitting Bolivia along racial and ethnic lines, something that
would be tantamount to the declaration of a civil war.
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agribusiness in the region. This would include the availability of bank loans, the
establishment of external markets (perhaps with the effective implementation of the
FTAA by 2005), competitive production levels, and significant investment in mechanized
farming equipment. In this way, none of the current vested interests in the land and
INRA process are allowed to accumulate to the detriment of the government, and the
INRA process—with significant international aid—proceeds relatively apace.
Scenario 5.3.

The particular case of the region of Santa Cruz (High
Probability)

In this scenario, economic development and social equity are contradictory goals that
could result in a potentially disastrous outcome. Today, lowland Indian organizations,
particularly CIDOB, are much better organized. In recent years, these organizations have
found themselves in a better position to exact concessions, both from the region and from
the state. Along with CIDOB, other emergent political movements in the lowlands, most
obviously the different branches of the MST, are present in the Santa Cruz and Chaco
regions. Influential agribusiness actors in the region that are well represented by such
organizations as the CAO, and sister organizations representing the transport sector, the
cattle sector, and other business interests, are also present. This second group is, to some
degree, unified under the banner of the regionally powerful Comité Cívico Pro-Santa
Cruz.
In addition to having fundamentally different goals, these two broad groups are divided
by social, cultural, and ethnic characteristics. CIDOB and the other groups bring together
a series of potentially explosive elements. These include a militant lowland Indian call
for autonomous territory, and a possibly developing alliance with the MST, which
increasingly represents both “Colla” and “Camba” interests within the region in terms of
a burgeoning Indigenous movement tied to disparate land issues. 16 They also include
increasingly large numbers of economically disenfranchised migrants from other areas.
At the same time, the business interests brought together through the Comité Cívico ProSanta Cruz represent a close-knit, urban, “mestizo” regional elite. These businessmen
express an entrenched regional chauvinism (perhaps best illustrated by the creation of La
Nación Camba), disdain for government in La Paz, and a siege mentality about perceived
current threats to agribusiness in the region. 17 The INRA law adds fuel to this fire, in so
far as it justifies and encourages the presence of an increasing number of in- migrants to
the region. It also increases the perception among Santa Cruz’s business elite that little is
being done to adequately develop the region’s economy, and that they have been
perennial victims of stop-gap and short-sighted government development planning.

17

The paradox of this particular view is that since at least the 1970s, the government in La Paz has had a
strong pro Santa Cruz bias. This is clearly evident in the development strategies adopted by most
governments since at least 1971. One of our interviewees noted, for example, that a “Camba” clique in the
cabinet, which is preventing any enlightened solution to the land problem, dominates the current
government. In the CVA team’s view, La Paz governments have been decidedly pro Santa Cruz.
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To avoid major future conflicts in this region, the potentially contradictory goals of
building up the economic potential of regional agribusiness in a global marketplace and
of comprehensively accounting for the growing presence of in- migrants and INRA-based
demands for the recognition of indigeno us land rights such as TCOs must be addressed.
Several potential triggers for conflict in this arena include: 1) the assassination of
migrants associated with the MST, as has recently taken place in Yapacaní and
elsewhere; 2) the organization of a symbolic march and media circus or other similar
large-scale mobilizations, which force the government to act on behalf of the indigenous
groups involved; and 3) NGO-sponsored programs in the region that benefit either of
these vested interests to the obvious exclusion of the other. One potentially important
window of vulnerability might be the establishment of an FTAA around 2005, and
whether Santa Cruz’s agribusiness and economic sectors can compete in an open market
environment. If a careful balance of regio nal forces is not maintained in Santa Cruz, the
question of land and land use could degenerate into a long-term and divisive contest.

CONCLUSIONS
Bolivia is facing the worst economic, political and social crisis in its 20 year-old
democracy. For the foreseeable future, Bolivia will be immersed in an overall scenario of
precarious stability where the potential for conflict is great. The risks in such a situation
are numerous as any minor incident could serve as the trigger for larger scale conflict.
This was indeed the situation in February where what appeared to be a labor dispute with
the police, engulfed the nation and almost brought down the current government. In mid
2003, dozens of potential triggers exist that could detonate a major nationwide conflict.
For this reason, despite the staying capacity of the current government, the possibility for
a repetition of the February situation is great, although it may involve different actors and
substantially different triggers.
This assessment updated the analysis around the five principal conflict areas identified in
the first CVA. The most obvious conclusion continues to be that the precarious stability
that characterizes Bolivia will continue to be the dominant trait. This condition will
require careful renegotiation between the government and the major opposition force,
along with the social groups the latter has mobilized. The amelioration of conflict will
depend greatly on the ability of the Sánchez de Lozada administration to disaggregate
conflict and continue to resolve each individual grievance on its own terms. At the same
time, conflict mitigation depends on the direction that the MAS- led opposition takes over
the course of the next few years.
Despite all that has occurred since February 2003, the MAS has the potential of maturing
into a loyal opposition with a degree of commitment to the democratic system. To
achieve this end will require a maturing of the MAS as a political party with a clear-cut
programmatic base beyond the defense of the cocaleros, who are Evo Morales’ key
constituency. For this reason, this assessment concludes that any significant breakdown
of conversations with Evo Morales, especially if followed by attempts to demonize him,
will inevitably lead to conflict beyond the coca growing regions.
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This does not mean, however, that Evo Morales can control the more radical sectors of
the coca growers federations or that he can reign in groups like the MIP in the Altiplano.
Whether major national and international actors accept this reality or not, the fact is that
Evo Morales is the only leader in Bolivia capable of mobilizing large sectors of the
population. He is also the most popular figure in Bolivian politics today and will be a
presidential contender for years to come. Morales has also developed international
prominence, which has enabled him to secure significant resources to fund his party and
its long term political objectives. As noted in the first CVA, the incorporation of the
MAS was a major accomplishment. Keeping it inside the tent will be an even greater
victory.
If Morales fails to evolve within the confines of Bolivian democracy, the alternative is
indeed catastrophic for Bolivia, as it is likely that all of the conflict areas analyzed in this
updated assessment could explode simultaneously. This catastrophic scenario would
include a complete economic collapse, major regional confrontation-even a civil war,
international isolation, and the end of Bolivian democracy. The conditions for this
situation are latent and it will take the best efforts of Bolivian leaders to avert this
collapse.
Conflict mitigation in Bolivia also depends on the role that other national actors play and
the extent to which they can help preserve the democratic system. In particular, the
Catholic Church continues to play a key role, and it is likely that it can forge a national
agreement to insure that non- violence prevails. The private sector, the media and other
civil society organizations could also help bring some semblance of stability. Without
their assistance, the life support given to the current government and to the democratic
regime by the loans and donations from the international community will not be enough.
The other opposition forces, especially those found within aspiring political leaders such
as Manfred Reyes Villa and former president Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, also have a major
responsibility that they have so far failed to assume. Both aspire to lead Bolivia in the
near future or at least in the year 2007. Unless the precarious stability scenario is
maintained, they may not have a country to govern.
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Selected Newspaper Coverage
La Razon
2002
El MNR y el MIR ajustarán la estructura del Ejecutivo, La Razon, July 27
La causa del Movimiento Sin Tierra. La Razón December 6
Los cocaleros deciden ir al bloqueo y seguir dialogando. La Razón
December 6
La Comisión Agraria se repone para distribuir tierras fiscales. La Razón, December 11
3 sectores piden autonomía para explotar la tierra y sus recursos. La Razón, December 13
7 sectores se suman y tienen sus propias reivindicaciones, La Razon, January 15, 2003
2003
Las mesas de trabajo sólo son de debate y no anularán otros procesos de diálogo, La
Razon, January 28
“El impuesto no es progresivo en términos porcentuales,” La Razon, Februa ry 10
Los salarios se achican, la banca teme por la mora y el ahorro, La Razon, February
Las familias tendrán que modificar sus presupuestos, La Razon, February 11
El Presidente no cede, pese al rechazo generalizado, La Razon, Febrauary 11
El MAS y NFR hablan de resistir juntos al Gobierno, La Razon, February 11
En un “cuarto de guerra” los estrategas suavizan las medidas,” La Razon, February 11
La resistencia a la renta al salario une a empresarios y Trabajadores, La Razon, February
11
El FMI dio luz verde al impuestazo a los salarios, La Razon, February 12
El impuestazo, La Razon, February 12
Pardo no sofoca la rebelión y la tensión se expresa en disparos, La Razon, February 12
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Estudiantes de la UPEA provocan actos vandálicos, La Razon, February 12
Las víctimas recibieron balazos en partes específicas del cuerpo, La Razon, February 13
Los tarijeños marcharon en contra del impuestazo, La Razon, February 13
Cronica, Muertos, heridos, caos y una renuncia en un día infernal, La Razon, February 13
El país protestó y Cochabamba, La Paz y El Alto sufrieron excesos, La Razon, February
13
La Defensora del Pueblo pide una actitud de paz, La Razon, February 13
A medianoche se agotó la sed de los violentos saqueadores, La Razon, February 13
La protesta de los policías echó raíces ya en enero, La Razon, February 14
Sólo quedan restos de cenizas en estratégicas oficinas públicas, La Razon, February 14
Los policías piden buena comida y mejor trato, La Razon, February 14
La oposición y 2 sectores piden la renuncia de Goni, La Razon, February 15
Morales y Reyes Villa en intensas actividades, La Razon, April 19
A tres meses de febrero, la OEA llega con sus recomendaciones, La Razon, May 12
¿Cómo y cuándo reformar la Carta Magna? Aún no existe un acuerdo, La Razon, June 6
Diez meses en el balance, La Razon, June 7
Goni pone fin a la pelea por pegas y dice que empezará a cumplir La Razon, June 7
La calificación del Presidente se mantiene estable en tres meses, La Razon, June 7
5 supuestos delincuentes se salvan de ser linchados, La Razon, June 7
La PTJ está tras el rastro del supuesto grupo irregular, La Razon, June 7
Goni decide dar pelea al MAS, a la crisis, la corrupción y el crimen, La Razon June 14
El proyecto del MAS no sintoniza con las demandas cocaleros, La Razon June 14
Chapare: Un explosivo mató a dos soldados y dejó heridos a siete, La Razon June 15
Morales rechaza la acusación del gobierno sobre atentado La Razon June 15
Evo Morales demanda a Yerko Kukoc, La Razon June 23
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Los Sin Tierra toman dos haciendas en los Yungas y en el Chaco, La Razon, July 4
El Nuevo Dia
2002
Yapacaní fue el epicentro de la guerra por tierras. Nuevo Dia, December 8
La Prensa
2003
Hay un desesperado llamado al diálogo, La Prensa, January 16, 2003
Goni y los partidos están en campaña electoral, La Prensa June 15, 2003

Los Ti empos
2002
“Investigan infiltración de subversivos,” LosTiempos, September 14
El ejército está listo en el Chapare. Los Tiempos, December 6
2003
Miles de manifestantes en la paz, Los Tiempos, January 16
Los fines ocultos de la violencia, Los Tiempos, January 16
Empresarios cochabambinos piden retomar el diálogo, Los Tiempos, January 16
MAS insiste en interpelar a ministros, Los Tiempos, February 11
Repudio de sindicatos, politicos opositores, y empresarios, Los Tiempos, February 11
Repercusiones al contenido del informe de la OEA, Los Tiempos, Cochabamba May 13

El Mundo
2003
Policial: Matarán a los delincuentes, Santa Cruz, El Mundo, June 6
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El Di ari o
2002
Desarrollo alternativo está a punto de fracasar en Chapare. El Diario December 9
Pul so
2002
El Nuevo Monstruo Político, Pulso August 2 to 8
Espinoza, Claudia and Gustavo Guzmán, “En Santa Cruz…es un sin tierra, ¡oiga!”
Pulso. December 13 to 19, 2002.
Todo Sigue Igual. La Policía un año después de Blas, Pulso, December 13 to 19, 2002.
Despues del dialogo la Realidad: 13 semanas hablando de coca, ¿quién da más? Pulso,
December 20 to 26, 2002
2003
Andres Torrez Villa Gomez, La viabilidad de un pacto social en Bolivia, Pulso, March 21
to 27, 2003.
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